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This Article provides the first detailed critique of the Common
Good/Harvard School of Public Health proposal to replace medical
malpractice jury trials with adjudication before specialized health courts. I
conclude that the modest benefits likely to be produced by the current health
court proposal are more than matched by the risks of bias and overreaching
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that these courts would also present. Missing from the plan is the doctrinal
change most likely to improve patient safety - hospital enterprise liability.
Without enterprise liability, the health court proposal is unlikely to achieve its
patient safety goals and, as a result, simply does not offer patients a sufficient
quid pro quo to justify their loss of the right to a trial before a jury of their
peers.
INTRODUCTION
Momentum is gathering to take medical malpractice cases out of civil courts
and assign them to administrative health courts. Both houses of Congress have
held hearings on legislation that would authorize the creation of specialized
health courts.' Similar legislation has also been proposed in half a dozen
states.2 Experiments with health courts have also been recommended by the
Institute of Medicine and the American Medical Association. 3
Although administrative health courts have been proposed in the past, the
current proposal has progressed farther in the legislative process than any that
have come before it. Furthermore, the current proposal has much wider
support among industry stakeholders than either of the two most prominent
proposals of the 20th century. Part of that increase in support probably stems
from the surge in energies dedicated to improving patient safety following the
Institute of Medicine's 2000 report To Err is Human.4 For patient safety
advocates, specialized health courts are not so much a means of taking
malpractice cases away from juries, as physicians have long demanded; health
courts are a vehicle for redesigning medical injury adjudication so that it
supports, rather than impedes, efforts to reduce iatrogenic injury through
greater professional candor about medical error.
The current proposal also benefits from the identity of its principal sponsors.
The public interest organization Common Good, which describes itself as
bipartisan, has partnered with the respected health policy experts at the
Harvard School of Public Health and the equally respected Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation to draft a plan for specialized health courts and sell it to
lawmakers. 5 They have already assembled a long list of supporters, ranging
from conservative Senator Bill Frist to the more liberal Progressive Policy
Institute. 6
' See Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006); Medical
Liability Procedural Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 1546, 109th Cong. (2006).
2 See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text.
3 See generally INST. OF MED., FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING
FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS 10 (Janet M. Corrigan et al. eds., 2002).
' See generally INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN (2000).
Jeanne Lenzer, Medical Courts Could Ease US Malpractice Crisis, Group Says, 330
BRIT. MED. J. 382 (2005).
6 Progressive Policy Institute Endorses Special Health Courts, COMMON GOOD, Feb. 17,
2005, http://cgood.org/healthcare-newscommentary-inthenews-224.html; Senate Majority
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Because congressional testimony is presented in a format that stresses
partisan positions, none of the testimony presented to Congress offered a
disinterested and thoughtful sorting of the strengths and weaknesses of health
courts. Instead, proponents gave the strongest possible case in favor of health
courts and opponents listed all conceivable shortcomings. 7 This Article fills
that gap, separating the strong arguments from the weak, identifying the most
important uncertainties, and recommending safeguards to reduce some of the
risks.
The greatest weakness of the current proposal lies not in what it provides,
but in what it omits. Missing from the plan is the doctrinal change most likely
to improve patient safety - hospital enterprise liability. Even the Harvard
researchers currently working on the health courts plan have conceded this
point many times in the past.8 Without enterprise liability, the health courts
proposal is dramatically less likely to achieve its patient safety goals and, as a
result, simply does not offer patients a sufficient quid pro quo to justify the loss
of their right to a trial before a jury of their peers.
Part I of the Article describes the central features of the health courts plan
currently being proposed by Common Good and researchers from the Harvard
School of Public Health. The next Part examines the likelihood that health
courts will improve the system of malpractice adjudication as measured by the
following five criteria: more just outcomes (Part II.A), fewer frivolous claims
and more legitimate ones (Part 1I.B), greater efficiency (Part II.C), more
defensible awards for pain and suffering (Part II.D), and better deterrence (Part
II.E). Part III then defends my claim that lawmakers should not create a
system of health courts unless the legislation also imposes hospital enterprise
liability.
As they are currently conceived, the very modest benefits that a system of
health courts would likely confer are balanced by the genuine risks of bias and
overreaching by the courts. The addition of enterprise liability would shift that
balance because it would greatly improve the likelihood that malpractice law
will serve as an engine for patient safety improvements, while simultaneously
taking individual physicians out of the line of fire. Enterprise liability could
Leader Bill Frist Calls for the Creation of Special Health Courts, COMMON GOOD, July 19,
2004, http://cgood.org/healthcare-newscommentary-inthenews-140.html?. For more
detailed information on endorsements for health courts see Common Good, Endorsements,
http://cgood.org/leam-people-endorsements.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
7 See, e.g., Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. 26-27 (2006) (statement of
Michelle Mello); Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for
Patients: Hearing of the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 109th Cong.
44, 45 (2006) (statement of Philip K. Howard, Founder and Chair, Common Good;
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School).
8 See, e.g., PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY,
MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION 144-52 (1993) [hereinafter WEILER
ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE].
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allocate the costs of liability insurance more fairly among physicians, while
improving the system's capacity to weather the periodic storms generated by
the insurance cycle. Without these benefits, especially the improvements in
patient safety, the benefits of health courts are too modest and too speculative
to justify abrogating the patient's right to a trial by a jury of her peers.
I. THE 21 ST CENTURY HEALTH COURT PROPOSAL
Under the Common Good/Harvard School of Public Health plan, medical
malpractice cases would be taken out of the judicial system and handled by an
administrative process similar to workers' compensation claims. 9 Patients
seeking to make a claim arising out of a hospital stay would start the process
by filing their claim at the hospital or with its liability insurer.'0 No lawyer or
judicial paperwork would be required.
A group of medical experts convened by the hospital would then evaluate
the claim to decide whether the care given to the patient met the standard of
care." All significant injuries caused by a physician's failure to follow "best
practices" would be compensable.' 2 This new and tougher standard of care
would be called an "avoidability" standard because it would permit patients
whose injuries could have been avoided using state-of-the-art medicine to
recover.13
Either party would be entitled to appeal the panel's decision. In addition,
the patient would be allowed to appeal the size of the monetary offer made by
the defendant's liability insurer and would not need a lawyer to do so.' 4 In the
event of an appeal, an administrative law judge specializing in health court
adjudications would review the claim de novo using all available materials,
including a live hearing, if requested.' 5 After input from a court-appointed
medical expert, the health court judge would render a verdict and produce a
written opinion with precedential authority.'
6
The sponsors of this plan believe that it has several important advantages
over the current judicial process. First, cases will be resolved more quickly
because the adjudicative process will be streamlined and some claims will
automatically qualify for compensation under an ex ante schedule of
I For the most recent and complete account of this, see generally Michelle M. Mello et
al., "Health Courts" and Accountability for Patient Safety, 84 MILBANK Q. 459 (2006).
10 Id. at 464. Under one possible claims process, the hospital would be required to report
the event to the insurer and would be surcharged if the insurer learned of the incident from
the patient. Id.
"Id.
12 Id. at 466.
13 Id.
" Id. at 464. Claimants without lawyers could also ask the health court to evaluate the
settlement offer made by the insurer. Id.
11 Id. at 464-65.
16 Id. at 464.
[Vol. 88:227
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"accelerated-compensation events" (ACEs).' 7 Second, average payouts would
be reduced because pain and suffering recovery would be capped according to
the severity of the injury, the collateral source rule would not apply (meaning
that payouts would be reduced by the amount collected from other sources,
such as insurance), and periodic payment of future damages would be
permitted.18 Third, the cost of litigating will go down because the process will
be simplified and many claimants will proceed without counsel.' 9 Fourth,
verdicts and settlements will be more rational and more fair because health
courts will rely on specialized judges, "neutral" experts, written precedents,
and ex ante ACEs.20  Fifth, health courts will better serve the goal of
compensating injured patients because the simplified claims procedure and the
state-of-the art standard of care will provide recovery to more of the patients
who are unnecessarily injured by their medical care. 2'
Finally, health courts will better promote patient safety.22 By taking fault
terminology out of the standard of care and transferring decision making from
juries to specialized judges guided by independent expert witnesses, health
courts, say sponsors, will reduce physician defensiveness and make physicians
less reluctant to speak openly about the sources of medical error. 23 Health
courts will also promote safer clinical practices by giving physicians better ex
ante guidance about the standard of care. Perhaps most exciting to public
health scholars, the health court would serve as a central repository for claims
24information that could be studied to improve patient safety standards.
This long list of potential benefits has generated an equally long list of
supporters. 25 On it are ten university presidents and eleven medical school
deans. Two highly distinguished health policy experts are also included - Paul
M. Ellwood and Alain C. Enthoven.26 Their presence is noteworthy because
one is a fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute and the other
'7 Id. at 467, 476.
18 Id. at 467-68, 470.
19 Id. at 462-63.
20 Id. at 464; Common Good, Frequently Asked Questions About Health Courts,
http://cgood.org/f-healthcourtsfaq.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
21 Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 26-27 (statement of
Michelle Mello). This might magnify tort law's deterrent signal. Mello et al., supra note 9,
at 471 (arguing that improvements in the system's accuracy should clarify the deterrent
signals to providers). The effectiveness of the deterrent will depend on whether this effect is
offset by the reduction in compensable damages.
22 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 470-71. In addition, doctors may be more willing to
disclose and discuss errors under a standard of care that does not imply negligence. Id. at
471-74.
23 Id. at 471-74.
24 Id. at 476.
25 More than 80 Prominent Leaders Endorse Special Health Courts, COMMON GOOD,
Feb. 7, 2005, http://cgood.org/ healthcare-newscommentary-inthenews-218.html.
26 Id.
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at the more liberal Brookings Institute. 27  Paul Weiler, the lead legal
investigator of the famous Harvard study of New York hospitals, is a
supporter.2 8 So are Dr. Louis Sullivan, the former Secretary of Health &
Human Services, and Dennis O'Leary, President of the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organization (the JCAHO). 29  Other
organizational sponsors include the AARP, the Democratic Leadership
Council, the National Committee for Quality Assurance, and six major
academic medical centers. 30 Supportive editorials have appeared in the New
York Times, 31 the Economist, 32 and USA Today.3 3 Endorsements range from
medical societies, like the American Academy of Family Physicians and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, to consumer groups,
like Consumers Advancing Patient Safety. 3 4 On June 26, 2007, the American
Medical Association reaffirmed its support and outlined the principles that
should guide the creation of a health courts system.35
Lawmakers have noticed. Senators Max Baucus (D-Mont.) and Michael B.
Enzi (R-Wyo.) introduced Senate Bill 1481, the Fair and Reliable Medical
Justice Act, 36 to fund ten innovative pilot projects to improve the resolution of
medical malpractice disputes, including a pilot program of health courts. 37 A
similar bill was introduced in the House by Representatives Jim Cooper (D-
Tenn.) and William "Mac" Thomberry (R-Tex.). 38 Both bills were supported
by Common Good.39
In addition, legislation to create health courts or small pilot experiments has
been introduced in several states, including Maryland, 40 New York,4 1
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Patient Safety & Health Care Quality Leaders Support Health Court Pilot Projects,
COMMON GOOD, July 5, 2006, http://cgood.org/healthcare-newscommentary-inthenews-
321 .html.
30 Common Good, Who Supports Health Courts?, http://cgood.org/f-
orgendorsements.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
31 Editorial, Malpractice Mythology, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2005, § 4, at 12 (calling for pilot
projects, including health courts, to promote tort reform).
32 Editorial, Scalpel, Scissors, Lawyer, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2005, at 70.
33 Editorial, 'Health Courts' Offer Cure, USA TODAY, July 4, 2005, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/ 2005-07-04-our-viewx.htm.
34 Common Good, Who Supports Health Courts?, supra note 30.
31 See generally AM. MED. ASS'N, HEALTH COURT PRINCIPLES (2007), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama 1/pub/upload/mrnm/378/healthcrt.principles.pdf
36 Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1481, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
37 Id. § 3.
38 Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, H.R. 2497, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
39 Common Good, Legislative Activity on Health Courts, http://cgood.org/f-
healthcourtslegislation.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2008).
40 See S. 508, 422d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) (establishing a medical liability
division in circuit courts); H.B. 779, 422d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) (creating a
[Vol. 88:227
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Oregon,4 2 Pennsylvania, 43 and Virginia.44 Common Good attorney Paul
Barringer testified that additional state legislative activity was expected. 45
Initiatives are also reportedly underway in Wyoming, Colorado, Michigan, and
Massachusetts. 46
The momentum behind this proposal contrasts sharply with the lukewarm
reception given to a similar proposal made by the American Medical
Association in 1988.47 Like the current proposal, it would have taken medical
malpractice cases out of the courts and placed them in specialized health
courts.48 Unlike the current health court proposal, however, it would have
replaced private plaintiffs' attorneys working on a contingency fee with
lawyers from the staff of the new administrative agency. 49 In short, it called
for a physician's utopia. Juries would be replaced by specialized
administrative law judges, contingent fee plaintiffs attorneys would be
replaced by agency attorneys who would screen out the "frivolous" claims, and
full compensation for negligently injured patients would be replaced with
Task Force to study the creation of a medical liability division within the Maryland circuit
courts on the model of an existing, separate case management system for business and
technology cases); H.B. 338, 422d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) (establishing a task
force to study administrative compensation programs for birth-related neurological injury);
H.B. 48, 422d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) (creating a medical malpractice review
board of trained judges with the authority to hire neutral experts).
41 See S. 4149, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (authorizing health court pilot
projects within the court system), available at http://cgood.org/assets/
attachments/S4149.pdf.
42 See S. 655, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007), available at
http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/ORSB655.pdf.
41 See S. 678, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007) (authorizing a demonstration
program to examine an administrative medical liability system), available at
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/CFDOCS/Legis/PN/Public/btCheck.cfm?txtType=HTM&sessY
r=2007&sesslnd=0&billBody=S&billTyp=B&billnbr=0678&pn=0725.
44 See S. J. Res. 90, 2006 Sess. (Va. 2006), available at
http://cgood.org/assets/attachments Na_Joint_ Resolution_90.pdf, H.R.J. Res. 183, 2006
Sess. (Va. 2006) (providing for continuance of the Joint Subcommittee to Study Risk
Management Plans for Physicians and Hospitals, which is investigating the feasibility of
establishing a pilot health court and subsequently a system of health courts), available at
http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/ VaJointResolution_183.pdf.
41 Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 49 (statement of Paul
Barringer, General Counsel, Common Good).
46 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 460.
47 See AMA/SPECIALTY SOC'Y MED. LIAB. PROJECT, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO THE
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY DISPUTES: A FAULT-BASED,
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 1 (1988); Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative
Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1367
(1989).
48 AMA/SPECIALTY SOCIETY MEDICAL LIABILITY PROJECT, supra note 47, at 17.
41 Id. at 21-23.
2008]
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highly restricted damages.50 Because it was so one-sided, the AMA proposal
attracted little support and was quickly overshadowed by a more promising
proposal for fundamental malpractice reform. 51
In 199 1, a Reporter's Study for the American Law Institute (ALl) suggested
that the fault-based system now in use be replaced with a no-fault system of
compensation for medical injuries - similar to workers' compensation
insurance - and that hospitals, rather than individual physicians, be responsible
for buying the necessary insurance.52 In drafting this report, Paul Weiler built
upon the work of scholars like Havighurst, Tancredi, Keeton, and O'Connell,
who had proposed medical no-fault plans in the early 1970s.5 3 Despite its
radical proposals, the call for no-fault enterprise liability gradually
accumulated the support of many health policy experts because it directly
tackled the most serious shortcomings of the malpractice system, such as
inadequate deterrence, infuriated physicians, and excessive transaction costs,
while avoiding the usual preoccupation with the system's fictitious
shortcomings, such as pro-plaintiff juries and excessive damages awards. 54
No-fault liability promised to reduce blaming and, thus, rancor, while at the
same time protecting more of the patients who are injured by their medical
care.55  The proposals sought to reduce litigation time and expense by
eliminating the element of fault, thereby increasing the fraction of premium
dollars going to injured patients.5 6 Enterprise liability aimed to improve the
safety of care given to future patients by shifting the focus from individual
competence to system-wide safety precautions. 57 Although the ALI proposal,
like the AMA proposal that preceded it, would move malpractice adjudication
50 Id. at 67-78, 145-46.
51 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL
INJURY 112 & n.5 (1991); WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE, supra note 8, at
144.
52 1 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at ch. 10 (discussing medical
injury); 2 id. at chs. 4, 15 (discussing medical malpractice and elective no-fault medical
liability; Paul Weiler was the Chief Reporter of the study); see also PAUL WEILER, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991). Weiler's book was originally written as an ALI
background paper and Chapter 6 was the basis for ALI chapter 15 on no-fault medical
liability. 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 5 1, at 487.
53 See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst & Lawrence R. Tancredi, "Medical Adversity
Insurance" - A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 51
MILBANK Q. 125, 125-26 (1973); Robert E. Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents,
121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 616-17 (1973); Jeffrey O'Connell, Expanding No-Fault Beyond
Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REV. 749, 827 (1973).
54 See infra notes 439-446 and accompanying text.
55 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at I 11- 13.
56 Id. at 119.
7 Id. at 123, 512.
[Vol. 88:227
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from civil courts to administrative health courts, its bipartisan spirit and
content were dramatically different from the AMA proposal.
5 8
Two years later, the team of researchers who undertook the famous Harvard
Study of Medical Practice in New York hospitals added their support to the
ALl combination of no-fault and enterprise liability. 59 Weiler was on the
project as well, as were several faculty members from the Harvard School of
Public Health. 60 For the next decade, those public health scholars and their
colleagues lobbied vigorously and compellingly, but unsuccessfully, for a
small scale experiment with enterprise liability and no-fault recovery. 61 Health
care organizations and lawmakers were simply too frightened by the possible
costs to carry out an experiment.
By 2002, the Harvard Public Health researchers had reached the reluctant
conclusion that no-fault liability was not politically feasible. 62 However, they
continued to make the case for exclusive enterprise liability because they
rightly believed that enterprise liability had more potential to improve patient
safety than any other tort reform. 63 Then, in 2006, the researchers' public
advocacy for enterprise liability also ceased, as the Harvard School of Public
Health joined forces with Common Good and the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation to craft and lobby for a system of administrative recovery through
18 Compare id. ch. 15, with AMA/SPECIALTY SOC'Y MED. LIAB. PROJECT, supra note 47,
at 3-12.
59 HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK 11-9 (1990).
That team included two Harvard scholars who had helped write the earlier ALI study. Paul
Weiler, a Harvard law professor, was both the Chief Reporter of the ALI report and the
senior legal investigator on the Harvard Study. Troyen Brennan, a faculty member at the
Harvard Schools of Medicine and Public Health, also served on both projects.
60 See generally WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE, supra note 8.
61 Faculty members Troyen Brennan, Joseph Newhouse, Lucian Leape, and David
Studdert have written extensively on the subject, including the following: WEILER ET AL., A
MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE, supra note 8; Joseph P. Newhouse & Paul C. Weiler,
Reforming Medical Malpractice and Insurance, 14 REG. 78 (1991); William G. Johnson,
Troyen A. Brennan, Joseph P. Newhouse, Lucian L. Leape, Ann G. Lawthers, Howard H.
Hiatt & Paul C. Weiler, The Economic Consequences of Medical Injuries: Implications for a
No-Fault Insurance Plan, 267 JAMA 2487 (1992); David Studdert & Troyen Brennan, No-
Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries: The Prospect for Error Prevention, 286 JAMA
217 (2001); David M. Studdert, Eric J. Thomas, Brett I.W. Zbar, Joseph P. Newhouse, Paul
C. Weiler, Jonathan Bayuk & Troyen A. Brennan, Can the United States Afford a "No-
Fault" System of Compensation for Medical Injury?, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1997);
David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of "No-Fault"
Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2001); Paul
C. Weiler, Joseph P. Newhouse & Howard H. Hiatt, Proposalfor Medical Liability Reform,
267 JAMA 2355 (1992).
62 Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1595, 1625, 1628 (2002).
63 Id. at 1629.
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specialized health courts.64 This, too, was presumably a concession to
perceived political realities.
As a result, the phoenix rising from the ashes of the ALI/Harvard School of
Public Health proposal for no-fault enterprise liability is, instead, a revived and
amended version of the AMA proposal for a fault-based, individual liability
regime residing in specialized administrative health courts. 65 Although the
current health court plan substantially improves on the AMA proposal by being
more even-handed, the plan nevertheless sets upon a quixotic journey. 66 The
sponsors hope to achieve the kind of administrative cost savings found in no-
fault compensation systems,67 yet liability under the new system would still be
fault-based. The plan is also motivated by a sincere desire to generate the kind
of improvements in patient safety that could be expected from a system of
hospital enterprise liability,68 yet liability would continue to reside in
individual physicians. As a result, the benefits produced when this plan is put
into operation are destined to be disappointing. Furthermore, the attempt to
squeeze these benefits from a plan lacking such crucial ingredients creates
troubling new risks. The rest of this Article assesses both these likely benefits
and the potential risks.
II. RISKS AND BENEFITS OF THE HEALTH COURTS PROPOSAL
Heath courts proponents offer five primary arguments in favor of their
proposal: fairer outcomes, a better mix of claims filed, improved efficiency,
more consistent damage awards, and improved patient safety. While each of
these arguments has merit, important weaknesses inherent in the proposal
could significantly undermine the benefits of health courts. Moreover, health
courts proponents have predicated their proposal on several erroneous
assumptions. For health courts to beneficially reform medical malpractice
adjudication, these assumptions must be dealt with.
In its current state, the risks inherent in the health courts proposal would
likely outweigh the potential benefits. First, several features of the health court
plan are likely to produce bias in favor of physicians. These risks negate the
reform's modest potential for improving the accuracy of adjudicated outcomes.
The judicial system already does a remarkably good job of sorting the strong
cases from the weak and producing fair outcomes. Second, the problems of
over-claiming and under-claiming are as likely to get worse as to get better.
Third, health courts proponents hope to eliminate certain procedural safeguards
to streamline the administrative process. Without these safeguards, the
I Common Good, Frequently Asked Questions About Health Courts, supra note 20.
65 See supra notes 1-7, 37-46 and accompanying text.
I The improvements include a heightened standard of care, a schedule of damages, and
reliance on private plaintiffs attorneys.
67 See, e.g., Mello et al., supra note 9, at 465-67.
68 See, e.g., id. at 471; More Than 80 Prominent Leaders Endorse Special Health Courts,
supra note 25.
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administrative tribunal will undo a century of judicial reforms designed to
insure that cases are decided fairly on the merits. Fourth, the proposal to
award pain and suffering damages according to a schedule, while theoretically
appealing, would work great harm if the schedule is used simply to reduce
recoveries. Fifth, health courts are unlikely to deliver the improvement in
patient safety that proponents seek most: greater physician disclosure of errors.
Most importantly, the health courts proposal does not include a provision for
enterprise liability - I address that shortcoming in Part III.
A. The Prospects for Producing Fairer Outcomes
Supporters of malpractice reform charge that the existing system of
malpractice adjudication reaches irrational and unjust outcomes. 69 Juries, they
claim, are easily hoodwinked by shrewd plaintiffs' lawyers, unscrupulous
"hired gun" expert witnesses, and sympathetic plaintiffs. 70 Frightened by the
prospect of a jury decision, malpractice insurance carriers and their insureds
supposedly agree to unwarranted settlement payments. In the words of one
famous study, the civil justice system is just an "expensive sideshow."' 71 The
main event is the coercion of unwarranted settlements from innocent
physicians. President George W. Bush stated the charge this way:
Doctors and hospitals realize ... it's expensive to fight a lawsuit, even if
it doesn't have any merit. And because the system is so unpredictable,
there is a constant risk of being hit by a massive jury award. So doctors
end up paying tens of thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of dollars
to settle claims out of court, even when they know they have done
nothing wrong.72
Although these charges hardly exhaust the complaints that are lodged
against the civil justice system and its handling of medical malpractice cases,
they constitute the heart of the case that is conveyed to the public and to
lawmakers. Injustice is a powerful justification for reform.
69 See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF
REFORM 1-2 (1995).
70 See id.; NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY:
CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS
DAMAGE AWARDS 122-23 (1995). Both the AMA and the Physician Payment Review
Commission have concluded that lay juries reach different decisions than physicians would.
VIDMAR, supra at 162; see also PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 186 (1992); AMA/SPECIALTY SOC'Y MED. LIAB. PROJECT, supra note 47, at 7-11;
Johnson et al., supra note 47, at 1370-71.
71 Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the
Outcomes of Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963,1967 (1996).
72 TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 13 (2005) (quoting President George
W. Bush, Speech in Collinsville, Ill. (Jan. 2005)).
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Advocates for health courts often repeat these charges, 73 suggesting that
health courts would produce better outcomes. Several components of the
health court proposal, they believe, have the potential to make claims
resolution more just. Among these are the use of specialist judges, guidance
from neutral medical experts, and greater reliance on practice guidelines to
provide the standard of care.74 Each of these changes has potential to improve
the decision-making process and, thus, deserves thoughtful consideration.
However, the foundational assumption that the civil justice system routinely
produces irrational or unfair outcomes is simply not supported by the evidence.
In fact, the charge of irrational outcomes is the weakest of the many charges
made against the current tort system. Both jury verdicts and settlements are
surprisingly congruent with assessments made by other physicians. To the
extent that litigation outcomes and peer assessments diverge, litigation
outcomes are more likely than peer assessments to favor physicians over
patients who sue them.
1. The Fairness of Jury Verdicts
Three decades of research provide a substantial evidentiary basis for
evaluating jury decision-making. 75 The four key findings that emerge from
that research are strikingly different from popular perception. 76  First,
negligence matters. The stronger the plaintiffs evidence of negligence, the
greater the likelihood of a plaintiffs verdict. 77 Plaintiffs win 10% to 20% of
the cases that reviewers feel they should lose, 78 20% to 30% of the cases rated
as toss-ups, 79 and roughly 50% of the cases deemed by expert reviewers to
have strong evidence of negligence. 80
Second, the agreement rate between juries and experts is better than
physicians typically have with each other. 81 In cases with weak evidence of
negligence, as judged by physician evaluators, defendants win 80% to 90% of
the jury verdicts. 82 The resulting discrepancy rate of 10% to 20% is better than
the 30% or higher rate of disagreement that physicians typically have when
73 See, e.g., Troyen A. Brennan & Philip K. Howard, Heal the Law, then Health Care,
WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2004, at B7.
74 See id.
71 Philip G. Peters Jr., Doctors & Juries, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1453, 1454 (2007).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1476 (citing Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A
Case Study of an Anesthesiology Department, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121 (1997)).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1464.
81 Id. at 1478. In addition, some of these disagreements can probably be attributed to
reviewer bias in favor of physicians and to jury access to more complete and stronger
evidence of medical negligence. Id. at 1478-79.
82 Id. at 1464.
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they are evaluating the performance of other physicians.8 3  A 30%
disagreement rate is also typical of performance evaluations in other
professions.8 4
Thus, it is disappointing that Philip Howard, the founder of Common Good,
stated that a jury trial "resembles Russian Roulette" and "would not be
considered a tolerable risk in other comparable professional activities. '8 5 That
contention is simply wrong because it treats every disagreement between the
jury and the reviewer as a jury error, rather than an instance of predictable and
inescapable inter-rater disagreement. And, it wrongly assumes that health
courts would have far fewer of them. In truth, the rate of agreement between
juries and reviewers is remarkably good - better than physicians typically have
with each other.
A third conclusion justified by the jury studies is that juries are much more
likely to depart from the opinions of the expert reviewers when doing so will
exonerate a defendant physician than when doing so would result in a verdict
for the patient. Doctors consistently win about 50% of the cases which
physician reviewers have concluded they should lose and 70% to 80% of the
cases with unclear or ambiguous evidence of negligence.8 6 This extraordinary
success rate suggests the presence of factors that systematically favor medical
defendants in the courtroom.8 7
There are several plausible explanations for the jury's unexpected reluctance
to hold negligent physicians liable. First, juries may be skeptical of patients
who sue their doctors. This is consistent with social science research finding
that prospective jurors have been listening to the unrelenting complaints of
physicians and politicians over the past twenty years and sympathize with
83 See, e.g., Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical
Examination of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199, 204-05 (1991) (finding 30%
disagreement or ambiguous findings); A. Russell Localio et al., Identifying Adverse Events
Caused by Medical Care: Degree of Physician Agreement in a Retrospective Chart Review,
125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 457, 457 (1996) (finding a similar disagreement rate on both
negligence and causation); Ralph Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical
Malpractice Cases: The Role of Standard of Care, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 877, 884
(finding that reviewers disagreed in 34.3% of the cases).
4 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in Criminal-Court
Decisions, in 2 THE MASTER LECTURE SERIES: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 119, 125 (C.
James Scheirer & Barbara L. Hammonds eds., 1983) (finding a disagreement rate among
scientists engaged in peer review of 25%, among employment interviewers of 30%, among
psychiatrists diagnosing psychiatric illness of 30%, and among physicians diagnosing
physical illness of between 23% and 33%).
85 Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients: Hearing
of the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, supra note 7, at 44-45 (statement
of Philip K. Howard).
86 Peters, supra note 75, at 1492.
87 Id. at 1493.
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them.88  Second, the preliminary evidence, though meager, suggests that
defendants are much more likely than plaintiffs to have experienced attorneys
and distinguished experts.89 Thus, defendants' hired guns are more skilled
than plaintiffs'. Third, juries may take the burden of proof very seriously in
medical malpractice cases, giving physicians the "benefit of the doubt" when
the experts for both sides are credible. 90 In some combination, these factors
probably explain why it is quite difficult for malpractice plaintiffs to win even
their strongest cases.
To the extent that jury bias in favor of plaintiffs is the perceived danger,
these findings should be reassuring. From the perspective of defendants, jury
performance is quite good. Although the civil justice system has many
drawbacks - including its limited ability to screen out meritless cases early, its
cost, and its failure to provide relief to the great majority of patients who are
harmed by medical negligence - jury bias against physicians is not one of
them.
2. The Fairness of Settlement Outcomes
Lobbyists for malpractice insurers and physicians have successfully
cultivated the popular belief that liability insurers are regularly forced to
accede to the outlandish settlement demands of plaintiffs with dubious claims
in order to avoid the "lottery" of a jury trial. 9' The public has been convinced
that malpractice defendants are forced to pay exorbitant settlements to
malpractice plaintiffs whose claims are dubious in order to avoid the risk of an
irrational jury verdict. 92 The actual settlement outcomes paint a very different
picture.
Numerous studies confirm that the odds of a plaintiff receiving a settlement
payment are directly related to the strength of the plaintiff's case. 93 The
stronger the evidence of negligence, the more likely the plaintiff is to receive a
settlement payment. In addition, the size of the settlement payment is directly
correlated with the strength of the patient's case. 94 Here, too, the studies show
that the amount paid to a plaintiff varies inversely with the quality of care
provided to the patient.
88 Id. at 1484.
89 id. at 1489.
90 Id. at 1491.
91 See Brennan et al., supra note 71, at 1963; Philip G. Peters, Jr., What We Know About
Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1783, 1819 (2007) [hereinafter Peters,
Settlements]; David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2025 (2006) [hereinafter
Studdert et al., Claims]. See generally HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 59.
92 See Peters, Settlements, supra note 91, at 1819.
91 Id. at 1787-95 (synthesizing several studies).
94 Id. at 1788-1801.
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Between 80% and 90% of the claims rated by expert reviewers as lacking
evidence of negligence are dropped or dismissed without payment.95
Furthermore, the amount paid to claimants in the remaining cases is often only
a token amount, such as the forgiveness of unpaid doctor's bills.96 By contrast,
cases with strong evidence of negligence settle at a much higher rate (77% to
95%), and the average payment is much larger. 97 Borderline cases fall in the
middle.98
A recent study by David Studdert and his colleagues found a strong
correlation between the merits of malpractice claims and the outcomes of
litigation.99 The authors divided the claims into six categories based on the
strength of the plaintiffs' evidence of negligence. The authors then determined
how often defendants paid plaintiffs in each category of claims. 100 They found
that the probability of a payment was directly tied to the strength of the
plaintiffs case: Payment was made in 19% of the claims with "[1]ittle or no
evidence" of error; 32% of the claims with "[s]light-to-modest evidence"; 52%
of claims deemed a "[c]lose call" but less than 50-50 probability; 61% of those
rated as a "[c]lose call" but greater than 50-50; 72% of the claims with
"[m]oderate-to-strong evidence"; and 84% of the claims with "[v]irtually
certain evidence." 101 As a result, the authors concluded that "the malpractice
system performs reasonably well in its function of separating claims without
merit from those with merit and compensating the latter."10 2
When a settlement does occur, its size is also driven by the merits.10 3 While
the great majority of plaintiffs with weak cases receive nothing at all, those
who do recover tend to settle for much less than similarly injured plaintiffs
with more meritorious claims. 104 As would be expected, claimants with cases
of uncertain merit receive more than claimants with low-odds cases, and
plaintiffs with strong cases receive the largest settlements, though not
necessarily the full amount of the damages they suffered. 105
15 Id. at 1804 fig.2.
96 Id. at 1813.
9' Id. at 1797, 1801.
98 Id. at 1802; infra note 101.
99 Studdert et al., Claims, supra note 91, at 2031.
0 Id. at 2029 fig.2. To do this, they used a one-to-six scale to measure the reviewer's
level of confidence for a determination of fault, ranging from "little or no evidence" to
"[v]irtually certain evidence." Id.
10 Id. These numbers exclude claims with dignitary injuries only (nine), no injuries
(thirty-seven), and no-error judgments (two). Id. Roughly 6% of the cases in which
payment was made followed a plaintiffs verdict (50 of the 798). Id. at 2030 tbl.2.
102 Id. at 2031.
103 Peters, Settlements, supra note 91, at 1796-1801.
104 Id. at 1813.
101 Id. at 1817-18.
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Thus, both the odds of a settlement and the size of any payment are driven
by the merits of the case. Considered separately, each type of discount seems
fair. Weak claims should fare worse, and they do. Yet, the presence of both
discounts appears to produce a greater total discount than the merits
necessitate.
The double effect is seen most clearly in the data on "toss-up" cases, i.e.,
those cases in which the evidence of negligence is ambiguous and the verdict
at trial could go either way. Negotiation theory predicts that nearly all of these
50-50 cases will settle for about half of the plaintiffs' damages. 06 That
happens in 60% of the cases. In the other 40% of the cases, however,
defendants are able to escape without making any payment at all.107 Thus,
borderline cases are discounted twice: once in the reduced amount paid to the
claimants who receive settlement offers, and again in the 100% discount
defendants get when no payment is needed to dispose of the cases. The ability
of malpractice defendants to escape payment in 40% of the toss-up cases
suggests that they have a significant advantage in bargaining power. This
conclusion is also supported by the evidence that the amounts paid to settle
malpractice cases fall short of expected value. 10 8
In hindsight, evidence that settlements are closely 'tied to the merits should
come as no surprise. Insurers, like claimants, have an economic incentive to
evaluate their cases accurately and to shape their settlement strategies
accordingly. Insurers accomplish their objectives by undertaking a form of
peer review in which they obtain multiple expert evaluations and rely on them
heavily.10 9 In addition, the empirical findings show that insurers possess the
bargaining power to insist that settlements be consistent with those expert
assessments. As Peeples and his colleagues have noted, it is ironic that
physicians see the absence of peer review as the major flaw in the current
system of malpractice adjudication."10 Peer review is precisely what the
settlement process currently provides.
What explains this discrepancy in negotiating power? One likely source of
this advantage lies in asymmetric stakes that give defendants the incentive to
fiercely fight low-odds claims."' Another source involves asymmetric risk
106 See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 220 (1993)
(explaining that settlements, unlike trials, will discount the damages to reflect the
probability of failure); Stephen J. Spurr & Sandra Howze, The Effect of Care Quality on
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 41 Q. REv. ECON. & FIN. 491, 502-04 (2001).
107 Peters, Settlements, supra note 91, at 1806 fig.4, 1814-16.
108 See Farber & White, supra note 83, at 207-08; Walter Orlando Simmons, An
Economic Analysis of Mandatory Mediation and the Disposition of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 6 J. LEGAL ECON. 41, 51-52 (1996); cf Stephen J. Spurr & Walter 0. Simmons,
Medical Malpractice in Michigan: An Economic Analysis, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
315, 337 (1996) (presenting consistent, but not statistically significant, findings).
'o See Peeples et al., supra note 83, at 884-85, 891-93.
o Id. at 892.
1" See Peters, Settlements, supra note 91, at 1819-22.
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tolerance, which prompts plaintiffs to settle their cases at a discount.1 12 Third,
both parties know that plaintiffs actually win very few jury trials and that cases
resulting in plaintiffs verdicts often settle for significantly less than the jury
award. 1 3 Finally, the defendant has superior access to useful resources."14
Together, these factors appear to push the amounts actually paid in settlements
below the value of the claims based on their underlying merits.
At the same time, there is troubling evidence that some settlement outcomes
are strongly influenced by strategic factors such as witness appeal, which are
unrelated to the quality of care received by the claimant.1 5 The role played by
strategic factors is disturbing because it substantiates complaints that the
system is irrational and unfair. However, while the current evidence suggests
that the impact of strategic factors is largely confined to uncertain cases,116 its
incidence is unknown.
When the jury studies and the settlement studies are considered collectively,
they justify the conclusion that the judicial system does a remarkably good job
of sorting the strong cases from the weak and of producing settlements that are
fair. As currently structured, the litigation process gives defendants, rather
than plaintiffs, an edge. When it errs, the current system tends to err on the
physician-defendant's side.
3. The Impact of Specialized Judges
Health court cases will be decided by a judge, rather than a jury. 117 The
judge will specialize exclusively in medical malpractice cases and will receive
guidance from a neutral expert witness whom he or she appoints. 1 8 These
reforms, say sponsors of the proposal, will produce more defensible outcomes
in malpractice disputes."19
The largest weakness of this claim is its assumption that the existing process
produces a substantial number of unjust outcomes. As explained above, that
premise is mistaken, at least insofar as it assumes that defendants bear the
brunt of the injustice. 12 Trial verdicts, in particular, already favor defendants
112 Id. at 1824-25.
113 Id. at 1825-28.
114 Id. at 1828-31.
115 See, e.g., Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury's
Shadow, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 74-75, 83 n.126 (1991); Paul L. Ogburn, Jr. et al.,
Perinatal Medical Negligence Closed Claims from the St. Paul Company, 1980-1982, 33 J.
REPROD. MED. 608,610 (1988).
116 With the significant exception of attorney experience (which strongly favors
malpractice defendants), we don't yet know whether strategic factors tend to favor one side
more often than the other. See Peters, Settlements, supra note 91, at 1829-31.
117 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 460.
118 Id. at 464.
119 Id. at 468.
120 See supra Part 11.A.1.
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more than they should. 121 Health courts cannot treat physicians any more
deferentially without demonstrating unconscionable bias in favor of
defendants.
Furthermore, researchers have found that judges usually agree with jury
decisions. The largest and most famous of these studies was undertaken by
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, 122 who found that the judge and jury agreed in
roughly eight out of every ten personal injury cases. 123 When the judge and
jury disagreed, the jury was almost as likely to have favored the defendant as
the plaintiff. 124 To put these data into perspective, 125 the judge-jury agreement
rate in tort cases, despite the common presence of dueling experts, is higher
(78%) than the inter-reviewer agreement rate observed in the medical
malpractice studies (around 70%).126 These reassuring findings are consistent




122 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JuRY (1966).
123 Id. at 64 n.12.
124 Id. at 63-65 (finding that the jury, but not the judge, favored the defendant in 10% of
cases, while the jury alone favored the plaintiff in 12% of cases). Heuer and Penrod did a
similar analysis with similar results. In the cases on which the judge and jury had disagreed
'(37% of the total set of cases), judges disagreed with jury defense verdicts (19%) as
frequently as they disagreed with jury verdicts for plaintiffs (18%). Larry Heuer & Steven
Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 29, 48 tbl. 13 (1994).
125 In addition, researchers have found similar rates of judge-jury agreement in criminal
trials. See, e.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 122, at 58 tbl.12 (finding 78% agreement);
Heuer & Penrod, supra note 124, at 48 tbl.12 (finding 71% agreement). Other surveys of
judicial opinion have found similar or higher estimates of the rate of judge-jury agreement.
See John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Juries Rule, 54 SMU L. REV. 1681, 1684 (2001); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the Bench, 26 GA. L. REV. 85,
97-98 (1991); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The Georgia Jury and Negligence: The View from the
(Federal) Bench, 27 GA. L. REV. 59, 70-71 (1992) [hereinafter Sentell, Federal Bench].
126 See Diamond, supra note 84, at 125 tbl.1.
127 In the Kalven and Zeisel study, for example, the judges typically believed that juries
that decided cases differently had reached reasonable decisions. See Neil Vidmar, The
Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 849,
853 (1998). A Georgia survey of state and federal judges found 94% of the judges felt that
the jury understood the case, and 87% believed that juries are not pro-plaintiff. Sentell,
Federal Bench, supra note 125, at 116 tbls. 16 & 17. All of the federal judges and 98% of
the state judges felt that jury performance was satisfactory or would be if some procedural
reforms were adopted. Id. at 117 tbl.18. At least 97% of both groups reported agreeing
with jury verdicts more than eight times out of ten, the approximate figure from the Kalven
and Zeisel study. Id. at 115 tbl. 14.
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In addition, researchers have found that greater case complexity does not
produce more disagreement between juries and presiding judges. 128 As a
result, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that their findings of strong judge-jury
agreement were "a stunning refutation of the hypothesis that the jury does not
understand."129
The only studies that shed light specifically on medical malpractice cases
are the few that have compared the outcomes in bench trials with the outcomes
in jury trials. When Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg looked at the
win rates for all federal civil trials between 1979 and 1989, they found that
malpractice claimants won 50% of their bench trials but only 29% of their jury
trials.130 Using 2001 data from the country's seventy-five largest counties, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics similarly found that medical malpractice plaintiffs
won 50% of their bench trials but only 26% of their jury trials. 131 Thus,
malpractice plaintiffs appear to win about half as often in front of juries as they
do in front of judges.
Moreover, this discrepancy is atypical of personal injury litigation generally.
In most civil litigation, other than malpractice and product liability litigation,
bench and jury success rates are roughly the same. 132 These findings raise the
128 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, 1 ANN. REV. L. &
Soc. Sci. 255, 271 (2005) (collecting and reviewing the studies); Neil Vidmar & Shari
Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1126, 1174, 1177
(2001).
129 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 122, at 157. At the same time, other studies have
documented the limitations of a lay jury in complex cases. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al.,
Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L.
REV. 727, 755-60 (1991); Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and
the Erosion of Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 365 (1998). The most
clearly established juror weakness lies in the comprehension and application of probabilistic
evidence. For example, people tend to overestimate the significance of some low
probability risks. See David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes' Theorem in the Trial
Process: Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1,
13-14 (1988); Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEI-Hv. 49, 60-70 (1996). See generally Cecil et al., supra, at 755-60. This could cause
them to overestimate, in hindsight, the riskiness of a physician's treatment. However, the
data on agreement rates suggest that this risk is offset by other factors that favor malpractice
defendants.
130 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1137 tbl.3 (1992).
131 THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TORT
TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 4 tbl.3 (2004), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ttvlc01 .pdf.
132 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 1137 & tbl.3 (1992). The Bureau
findings also suggest that malpractice litigation is unusual. The judge-jury discrepancy rate
was much larger in medical malpractice cases than it was in civil litigation generally (24%
compared to 14%). COHEN, supra note 131, at 4 tbl.3 (finding, for civil litigation generally,
a 65% win rate in bench trials versus a 51% win rate injury trials).
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possibility that juries are more deferential to physicians and more skeptical of
patients who sue than judges are. This finding squares neatly with the finding
that juries are less likely than independent physician reviewers to conclude that
a negligent physician should be liable. 133 Because malpractice attorneys may
systematically direct a different mix of malpractice cases to judges, it would be
a mistake to give too much weight to these comparisons of bench and jury trial
outcomes. Nonetheless, these findings certainly cast doubt on the likelihood
that physicians would find bench trials to be an improvement.
In addition, replacing juries with state health court administrative judges
creates new obstacles that could impede even marginal improvement. First,
judges are vulnerable to the same kinds of cognitive biases that can affect
juries, such as the framing and hindsight biases. 134 Second, judges are not
immune from normal human sympathy. Finally, these judgeships are not
likely to be sought by the most successful malpractice lawyers from either side.
Administrative judgeships are typically less highly paid and less prestigious
than trial or appellate court judgeships and are usually not filled by the most
successful lawyers. 135 All of these factors suggest that the improvement in
outcomes would be marginal at most.
By its very nature, a specialized tribunal poses its own set of risks. First,
repeat players in a specialized court can enjoy substantial advantages. In a
health court system, that advantage would accrue to malpractice defendants,
who also happen to be represented by experienced attorneys and claims agents
more often than plaintiffs. 136  These repeat players would benefit from
appearing regularly before the same judge or panel of judges. Continuing
interactions establish relationships of familiarity and trust. Shared lunches and
133 See supra text at notes 86-90 (exploring the reasons for jury bias in favor of
defendants).
134 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 796-
97, 801-03 (2001); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A
Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 491-93, 497-98 (2005).
135 See Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV.
329, 331 (1991). However, the intellectual challenge presented in Tax Courts may help
attract able judges. Id. at 337. The applicant pool would likely improve substantially if
health courts were created at the federal level, because federal court judgeships are much
more prestigious than state positions. Even in the federal system, however, administrative
law judges are paid far less than federal district court judges. Id. at 352.
136 See, e.g., SLOAN ET AL., supra note 106, at 207-08, 216 (finding that specialists
constitute a minority of plaintiffs' attorneys and recommending specialty certification);
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 107 fig.l, 110 (1974) (explaining that personal injury
insurers are typically repeat players, while personal injury plaintiffs are not); Catherine T.
Harris et al., Who Are Those Guys? An Empirical Examination of Medical Malpractice
Plaintiffs'Attorneys, 58 SMU L. REV. 225, 237 (2005) (reporting that defense counsel in the
study sample had handled, on average, more than twice as many malpractice cases as
compared to their counterparts).
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conferences can add to this foundation. Second, the appointed experts (i.e.,
physicians) who will work with the judges on a daily basis will probably
influence the judges' perspective. Those physicians will have a physician's
perspective of malpractice liability. Finally, the narrow range of issues faced
by a specialized court increases the incentive for interest groups to seek
influence in the process of selecting judges.137 Perhaps this is why Tom Baker
has called the plan a bald attempt by physicians to "capture the judges.' '1 38
Another important risk presented by health courts is that administrative
judges may not share the values of the public. For this reason, common law
cases in the United States have historically been tried before juries. Our use of
juries reflects deeply ingrained democratic values. 139  Its democratic
importance prompted Blackstone to call the jury "the glory of the English
law. ' 140  More recently, the United States Supreme Court stated that
"[m]aintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of such importance and
occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
care." 14 1 For this reason, both state and federal courts have generally held that
legislatures must provide aggrieved parties with a quid pro quo when they
replace jury trials with administrative proceedings. 142 Workers' compensation
plans, for example, were permitted because they gave injured workers a
13' Bruff, supra note 135, at 331-32.
138 Kristin Eliasberg, Malpractice Fix, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 2005, at El (quoting
Tom Baker); see also Carl W. Tobias, Essay, Health Courts: Panacea or Palliative?, 40 U.
RICH. L. REV. 49, 51 (2005) (observing the risk of capture).
139 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 122, at 6-7; Stephen Landsman, The History and
Objectives of the Civil Jury System, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 22, 29-
39 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
140 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *374.
"I Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935).
142 See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430
U.S. 442, 455 (1977); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (I11.
1976); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 904 (Ohio 1976); Lucas v. United
States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 691-92 (Tex. 1988); Howard Alan Learner, Restrictive Medical
Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to
Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. LEGIS. 143, 155-66 (1981); Amy Widman, Why
Health Courts Are Unconstitutional, 27 PACE L. REV. 55, 74-81 (2006). On the federal right
to trial by jury, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (holding that private rights
may not be removed from Article III courts) and Granfinanciera, S. Am. v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 42, 51 (1989). The Seventh Amendment provides: "In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
Nearly all states have similar constitutional provisions. See Widman, supra, at 84.
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substantial new right: workers were entitled to immediate and guaranteed
compensation without needing to prove their employers were at fault. 143
Given the historic importance of a claimant's right to have her grievance
heard by a jury of her peers, the modest potential for improved decision-
making associated with the use of specialized judges is too small a benefit,
standing alone, to justify the loss of a peer decision, especially when the risk of
pro-physician bias is taken into account. However, the health court plan offers
other potential benefits.
4. The Impact of Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses
Under the proposed health court plan, health court judges will appoint their
own expert witnesses to guide their deliberations. 144 Compared to the shift
from juries to judges, the use of court-appointed experts has much more
potential to improve the accuracy of malpractice verdicts, although it is
important to remember that the room for improvement is quite modest.
Conceivably, these court-appointed experts could provide guidance on more
than individual disputes. In the area of toxic torts, for example, panels of
court-appointed experts have helped courts sort out and bring closure to several
highly contested medical issues. 145 Perhaps something similar could occur in
medical malpractice cases, such as those involving the causation of cerebral
palsy in newborns. The experts for health courts could also be asked to write
guidelines for the resolution of frequently recurring fact patterns so that
recurring cases won't be decided anew each time they arise.
At the same time, judicial reliance on a single court-appointed doctor to
evaluate the conduct of another physician in the same specialty or subspecialty
could produce verdicts that unfairly favor physicians. The evidence on this
issue, however, is conflicting. On the one hand, the physicians who have
served as reviewers for medical malpractice carriers and for university
researchers studying jury verdicts were roughly twice as likely as juries to find
the performance of another physician to be negligent. 146 The reason for this is
unclear, but it could easily be caused by a combination of the reviewer's
superior ability to determine when testimony of the defendant's hired expert
lacked credibility, or by a lesser deference to the judgment of the physician
defendant. Whatever the reason, physicians who serve as private consultants
are less parsimonious in assigning error than juries are. If the court-appointed
143 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 573 (5th
ed. 1984). Workers are guaranteed immediate compensation for injuries arising from the
workplace in return for the loss of a jury decision on causation and damages.
14' Mello et al., supra note 9, at 464-65.
145 Troyan A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding
Alterative Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law
Courts, 51 U. PITr. L. REv. 1, 13-18 (1989).
146 See supra text at notes 75-90.
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physicians are as demanding as these reviewers have been, medical courts will
rule in favor of claimants more often than juries currently do.
On the other hand, studies have found that physicians are reluctant to label
another physician as negligent, indicating that court-appointed physician
experts might favor physicians over claimants. One study found that
physicians are so unwilling to label another physician's care as negligent that
they refuse to do so even when the treatment given to the patient was "clearly
erroneous."' 147 This finding is consistent with the widely-shared perception
that neither hospital peer review processes nor state licensure boards are
willing to take action against incompetent physicians. 148 It is also consistent
with reports of efforts by physician specialty groups to punish specialists who
give testimony they dislike. 149  Finally, the risk of bias might also be
influenced by the public setting in which these experts will testify,150 which
may place considerable pressure on the experts to demonstrate their loyalty to
the profession.
There is an obvious tension between the findings that physicians are loath to
indict one another and the evidence that physicians who review medical charts
for liability insurers are more willing than juries are to judge other doctors
negligent. In some contexts, they can be pressed to reveal their honest
impressions. Setting and role seem to matter. At present, we can only guess
how the role of court-appointed experts will affect their willingness to be
candid and even-handed. As a result, any initial experiment with health courts
absolutely must collect the data needed to evaluate the appointed physicians'
willingness to criticize defendants who have failed to meet the standard of
care.
5. Reforms To Produce More Predictable and Consistent Outcomes
Sponsors also hope the health courts proposal will improve medical
malpractice outcomes by clarifying the standard of care and increasing the
consistency of verdicts. 15' There are several reasons for this hope. First,
judges will issue written opinions that will both guide future clinical practice
and set precedent for future legal disputes. 52 Second, where evidence-based
practice guidelines- have been issued by credible medical authorities, those
guidelines will define the standard of care. 153 Finally, the administrative staff
of the health courts will identify common mishaps for which compensation
147 WEILER ET AL., supra note 8, at 125.
148 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 473.
149 See, e.g., Steve Ellman, Medical Associations Step Up Scrutiny of Doctors Who
Testify for Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs, DAILY Bus. REV., June 25, 2003,
http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/AwardStories/CodeOfSilence.html.
50 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 472.
151 Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 46.
152 Id.
"I3 Id. at 47.
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would be presumptively available ("accelerated compensation events"
(ACEs)). 54 This combination of written opinions, binding practice guidelines,
and ex ante identification of common compensable events could make it much
easier for physicians to conform their clinical practices to the standard of care
and also could enable health courts to render more consistent decisions post
hoc.
Although each of these reforms has the potential to improve upon the status
quo, a number of difficult details will need to be resolved. Health court
legislation will need to specify the criteria by which the legally binding
guidelines are to be identified. Currently, practice guidelines, or something
very like them, are drafted by a diverse range of health care entities, ranging
from individual practice groups to national specialty boards. Meanwhile,
physicians should be informed that this reform will not work a fundamental
change in malpractice litigation. Indeed, it is already common for defendants
and plaintiffs alike to tell the jury about applicable practice guidelines, either
through the testimony of their own expert witness or during the impeachment
of an opposing expert. 155 Furthermore, the data on jury verdicts suggest that
juries exonerate doctors who clearly comply with professional norms. 156
While legally binding practice guidelines are likely to improve malpractice
adjudication, their adoption will not resolve all cases involving practice
guidelines. The difficult cases commonly arise in two circumstances: where
the parties dispute whether the doctor fully complied with the applicable
guideline, and where the parties dispute whether the guidelines even apply in
the plaintiffs case. Those disputes will not be eliminated by the reforms
contained in the new health court plan.
Practice guidelines are most valuable in simple cases. But, simple cases are
the ones in which physicians are most certain about the appropriate medical or
legal standard of care, and are the ones that juries and settlement negotiators
are likely to resolve correctly even without health courts. Worrisome cases, on
the other hand, arise when the standard of care is disputed or ambiguous and
when the evidence of what happened to the patient is unclear. The outcomes
of these cases are most subject to argument and manipulation. In a new health
court system, however, such cases would not be governed by practice
guidelines and the ACEs.
Conceivably, written opinions by the health court couid reduur soae ofthi.
uncertainty over time, and the value of these decisions as precedent will turn in
large part on the extent to which they are tied to the unique facts of the case
before the court. Once again, however, it will be important to avoid undue
expectations. That is the lesson taught by the debate between Justices Holmes
and Cardozo nearly a century ago. In his famous lectures on the common law,
154 Id.
155 See 1 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 363-64 (1995) (commenting that the
source of the guideline determines its weight.
156 See id. at 362-66.
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Holmes argued that judges should gradually replace juries in deciding the
negligence issue because experienced judges would come to know community
standards and be able to formulate them in a set of concrete rules. Otherwise,
the jury would be left "without rudder or compass."' 5 7 After his appointment
to the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes convinced a unanimous Court to adopt
his view.' 58 "[W]hen the standard is clear," wrote Holmes, "it should be laid
down once [and] for all by the Courts."' 159 Seven years later, Holmes had
retired and Justice Cardozo convinced the Court to abandon Holmes's view.1
60
General rules, Cardozo argued, fail to leave room for individual
circumstances1 61 and that Holmes's view did not take into account the specific
facts of an individual case.' 62 Since then, American courts have only rarely
articulated specific rules for the decision of negligence cases. Instead, they
allow juries to consider the overall facts of each case. Whether health courts
will be more successful than Holmes will turn on the susceptibility of common
malpractice charges to ex ante resolution.
On balance, the combination of written opinions, binding guidelines, and
ACEs has some potential to make the legal standard of care more concrete and
to make verdicts more consistent. However, any improvements they produce
are likely to be modest. Given the many sources of uncertainty in medical
practice, 63 there is simply a limit to the detail with which legal standards of
conduct can be articulated in advance.
6. Synthesis
The research on medical malpractice verdicts shows that juries treat
physicians very fairly (perhaps with too much deference). 64 Given the limits
of human capacity to reconstruct past events and the inevitable subjectivity of
judgments about the quality of past performance, it is probably not possible to
design a fault-based adjudication system that will have a substantially higher
agreement rate in cases with weak evidence of negligence. 65 At most, modest
' OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 111-12 (Little, Brown & Co.
1945)(1881).
158 Bait. & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927). The Court ruled that a
person driving a car across a railroad track who cannot see whether a train is approaching
must "stop and get out of his vehicle" to check for trains. Id. at 69-70.
159 Id. at 70.
160 Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 103-05 (1934).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of Uncertainty,
3 HEALTH AFF. 74, 75 (1984); John Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Malpractice
Variations: A Proposalfor Action, 3 HEALTH AFF. 6, 7 (1984).
164 See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 93-116 and accompanying text.
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improvements may be possible through careful refinements, such as the
appointment of an expert who answers only to the court. 166
The data on settlement outcomes are similarly reassuring. To the extent that
juries and settlements err, the error is more likely to favor the defendant
physician than the plaintiff patient. 167 This evidence rebuts the claim that
health courts are needed to escape an irrational adjudicative process.
To the extent that health courts actually do provide more just decisions,
physicians are unlikely to appreciate the improvement. That is because the
greatest room for improvement in jury decision making lies in cases with
strong evidence of negligence. 168 Juries too often decide those cases in favor
of defendants. Physicians presumably do not expect health courts to correct
this injustice. If, instead, they expect to win even more cases, then satisfaction
of their wish can only occur if health courts are even more biased in favor of
physicians than the civil justice system.
Because health court judges will rely heavily on the opinions of their
approved physicians to reach decisions, pro-physician bias is a genuine
danger.' 69 Any experiment with health courts absolutely must include an
evaluation component to determine whether the new tribunals are yielding just
outcomes.
Other provisions of the health court plan are less worrisome. The
combination of written opinions, binding guidelines, and ACEs, for example,
has the potential to improve the fairness of judicial outcomes. 170 These
reforms are likely to make the legal standard of care more concrete and yield
verdicts that are more consistent over time. 71 Nevertheless, improvement will
be moderated by the fact that there is a limit to the detail with which legal
standards of conduct can be articulated in advance. 172 Still, a pilot test of these
provisions would be valuable. Whether or not this pilot can legally be
undertaken, however, will turn on whether injured patients have received a
sufficient quid pro quo to justify abrogation of their right to a jury trial.173
That is a topic to which I return after examining the other risks and benefits of
the health court proposal.
B. Impact on the Mix of Claims Filed
-ealth court supporters routinely charge that the current system for handling
medical accidents treats both patients and physicians unfairiy. in additiuio Lo
their charge that the judicial system poorly disposes of the claims that enter the
166 See supra notes 144-150 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 75-90, 93-116 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 86 and 87 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 157-163 and accompanying text.
173 See supra Part II.A.5.
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courthouse, health court supporters charge that the current system prompts the
wrong patients to sue. On the one hand, few of the patients who are injured by
medical negligence ever make a claim. In this respect, the system cheats
patients. On the other hand, physicians suffer from an avalanche of
unwarranted claims. Both of these charges have merit. Unfortunately, a
system of administrative health courts is unlikely to substantially reduce either
of these problems.
1. Impact on Under-Claiming
Too few malpractice claims are filed. Few serious scholars dispute that.1 74
Only 2-3% of patients injured by medical negligence ever file a claim. 75
Some of the under-claiming is because the injuries are relatively minor. Yet,
one highly respected scholar estimates that only about 3-5% of patients with
serious injuries make a claim.176 As a result, many scholars believe the current
legal regime does a poor job of protecting the rights and welfare of negligently
injured patients. 77
Sponsors of the health court plan believe that simplifying the claims process
and "mandating" disclosure to patients will increase the number of claims, thus
improving the system's ability to provide just compensation while also
strengthening its deterrent signal. 178 The sponsors' willingness to recognize
this problem and to look for solutions demonstrates an evenhandedness that is
uncommon among tort reformers. A system of administrative health courts
could conceivably reduce the problem of under-claiming by making the
process of filing a claim less daunting to injured patients. Initiating the process
might be as simple as requesting and completing a claim form at the hospital,
and the potential speed and relative simplicity of the claims resolution process
may reduce patient reluctance to initiate it. 179 In addition, the prospect of an
insurance surcharge could conceivably lead some hospitals to push harder than
they currently do for physician openness.
Nevertheless, many of the factors currently limiting claims will continue to
operate. Patients are still likely to have difficulty distinguishing medically
induced injury from the unfortunate progression of their disease or an unlucky
complication.' 80 Many will still lack advisors or confidantes who can help
I" See Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 21; Weiler et al., supra
note 61, at 2355.
175 A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse Events
Due to Negligence, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 247 (1991).
176 See, e.g., Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 26 (statement of
Michelle Mello).
177 See, e.g., id.; Johnson et al., supra note 47, at 1366.
178 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 471.
171 In addition, the "state-of-the-art" standard of care might prompt more claims by
making it easier for patients to determine whether they have a justified claim.
180 See BAKER, supra note 72, at 91.
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them understand their rights.' 8' Because physicians will still be individually
liable and apparently not subject to the surcharge, they are unlikely to assist
patients in making claims, as physicians reportedly do in Sweden.18 2
Furthermore, the planned abrogation of the collateral source rule will dilute
the benefits of claim simplification. The collateral source rule states that the
amount of damages paid to a plaintiff by a defendant will not be reduced by
payments received by the plaintiff from other sources, such as medical
insurance. 8 3 Today, minor and even moderate injuries are typically not worth
pursuing because the costs of malpractice litigation are so high and the odds of
success before a jury are low. 8 4 Abrogating the collateral source rule will
extend this de facto immunity to much more severe injuries because it will
preclude recovery for expenses that have been reimbursed by a third party
payor, such as disability coverage, sick leave, and health insurance. This
change will make patients with disability or health insurance even less likely to
make a claim than they are today.
Procedural simplification will soften this impact, but only marginally. Two
factors in particular will limit this suggested simplification's impact. First,
insurers traditionally resist paying legitimate patient claims until the patient
demonstrates her seriousness by hiring a lawyer or a medical expert. 185
Second, health courts sponsors have underestimated the extent to which fairly
resolving complex medical malpractice claims requires an equally complex
dispute resolution process. As will be explained in Part II.C, accurate decision
making in complex cases often requires both significant pretrial discovery and
multiple expert witnesses. 86 Thus, the simplicity of the claims process will
evaporate relatively quickly.
For all of these reasons, the new administrative claims process is unlikely to
experience a substantial net increase in legitimate claims. As long as it
abrogates the collateral source rule, 187 the proposed plan is more likely to
exacerbate under-claiming than to relieve it.
181 See id.
182 See Patricia M. Danzon, The Swedish Patient Compensation System: Myths and
Realities, 14 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 453, 454 (1994). In Sweden, physicians are not named
:.. a t4 ,t 4'55-56. In fact. neither the physicians nor their hospitals
pay premiums for liability insurance. Id. at 455. Instead, that insurance is funded out of tax
revenues. Id. Furthermore, claims made against the fund do not name individual
defendants. Id. at 460. These factors produce a climate of cooperation that is justly envied
by health safety advocates in the U.S. See generally id.
183 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 238 (5th ed. 1979).
184 See Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 27-28 (statement of
Michelle Mello).
i"5 See Peters, Settlements, supra note 91, at 1828.
186 See infra Part II.C for a defense of this conclusion.
187 This is not meant to suggest that abrogation of the collateral source rule is never
appropriate; that would be essential in a system of no-fault recovery and patients would
receive a fair quid pro quo.
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2. Impact on Over-Claiming
Physicians fairly complain that too many malpractice claims lack legal
merit. Somewhere between one-third and one-half of all medical malpractice
claims turn out to be baseless.1 88 In the most recent study, David Studdert and
his colleagues found that 37% of all claims in the sample lacked evidence of
medical error. 189
Defenders of the civil justice system point out that many of these claims,
perhaps most, are filed by patients who need to use the tools of pretrial
discovery in order to evaluate the quality of care they received. 90
Furthermore, the huge majority of unwarranted claims are dropped or
dismissed without payment.191 When patients insist on bringing them to trial,
defendant physicians rarely lose a jury verdict. 192
However, defenders of the civil justice system underestimate the emotional
and financial cost that physicians bear while waiting for the system to do its
filtering. 193 For physicians, being drawn into the process is itself a form of
punishment. 194  Thus, there are credible reasons for believing medical
malpractice defendants suffer more from unwarranted lawsuits than do
defendants in other routine tort actions, such as automobile accidents and
product liability cases.
Some of the factors that distinguish medical malpractice cases from other
tort actions are structural. First, medical malpractice claims are more likely to
lack merit than automobile negligence claims, perhaps because they are much
harder for the plaintiff to evaluate accurately. 195 Second, while automobile
drivers are as likely to be plaintiffs as defendants, 196 physicians are always
defendants in medical malpractice litigation. This lack of reciprocity surely
contributes to their widely-shared sense of victimization. Third, physicians are
much more likely to be drawn into court repeatedly than, for example, the
188 Studdert et al., Claims, supra note 91, at 2024.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 2030-31. Many claims are difficult to evaluate without hearing the recollections
of the physicians and nurses who provided the patient's care. See BAKER, supra note 72, at
91-92. Typically, they will not talk to a patient's attorneys unless the patient files suit and
takes their depositions. See id. at 90. Thus, filing a lawsuit is often a necessary part of
investigating the merits of a claim. See id. at 91-92. Until some form of "pre-lawsuit"
discovery is crafted to provide the necessary information, these lawsuits will continue.
191 Peters, Settlements, supra note 91, at 1475.
192 Id. at 1459-60 (finding that of the cases where liability was not admitted and liability
was a legitimate issue only 11% of the plaintiffs received a significant award of damages).
193 See Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on
Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REv. 65, 102 (1996).
194 Sara C. Charles et al., Sued and Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported Reactions to
Malpractice Litigation, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 563, 565 (1984).
195 See O'Connell, supra note 53, at 756.
196 See BAKER, supra note 72, at 18.
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average automobile driver. 197 While product manufacturers are even more
likely to be repeat defendants than physicians are, the target defendant in
products cases is typically a large corporation. 198 Physicians, on the other
hand, are sued as individuals, and predictably "take malpractice suits very
personally."' 99 As one physician explained, "[r]ather than being seen as a 'fact
of life' or a 'cost of doing business,' malpractice suits often threaten the core
of a physician's self-esteem. 200
A fourth difference arises out of the realities of the medical industry. A
charge of incompetence follows physicians for life, resurfacing whenever they
seek or renew their liability insurance, managed care contracts, licensure, and
hospital privileges. 20 1 Their obligation to report settlements in any amount to
the National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB") makes even a token payment a
permanent part of their history.20 2 Insurers and hospitals routinely go even
farther, demanding disclosure of every claim made against the doctor,
regardless of its disposition. 20 3 As one physician, Dr. Elliot Perlman, noted
after the case against him was dropped:
The lawyers advised me to forget it, but it's not that simple. Every year I
have to fill out forms from my malpractice insurer, hospital staffs, and
state licensing boards. I'm asked whether I've ever been convicted of a
felony and whether a malpractice claim has ever been brought against me.
So it's OK to have been accused of murder - but not of malpractice.
20 4
As Perlman correctly laments, doctors who are simply accused of error acquire
a record that follows them for life.
Lucian L. Leape, M.D., one of the pioneers in health quality research, points
out a fifth unique aspect of malpractice litigation that arises out of the culture
of medical practice. In everyday practice, the norms of medicine send the clear
message that mistakes are unacceptable. 20 5 "One result is that physicians, not
unlike test pilots, come to view an error as a failure of character . -"206 Once
197 Id.
198 WEILER ET AL., supra note 8, at 126.
199 ~,..d "E. A,,derson, Rillions for Defense: The Pervasive Nature of Defensive
Medicine, 159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2399, 2400 (1999).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See Teresa M. Waters et al., Impact of the National Practitioner Data Bank on
Resolution of Malpractice Claims, 40 INQUIRY 283, 283 (2003) (finding that physicians
have been less likely to settle claims since introduction of the NPDB in 1990, especially for
payments less than $50,000).
203 Elliott M. Perlman, Well-Managed Case Gets Caught in Malpractice Fervor, AM.
MED. NEWS, Feb. 21, 1994, at 14.
204 Id.
205 Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 1851 (1994).
206 Id.
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human error is transformed into a failure of character, every unwarranted
charge of negligence is experienced as a vicious libel. 20 7
Of these differences, the most important is almost certainly the personal
nature of a charge of medical negligence. When a physician is sued, she is
much more likely than an automobile driver who is sued for negligence to view
it as an attack on her competence and self-worth. The magnitude of personal
anguish is revealed regularly in the priority that physicians place on
malpractice reform and in the deep anger and distress that they express
individually in ordinary conversations about the topic. 20 8 They are elite and
powerful professionals who often base much of their personal identity and self-
worth on their professional status.209 As a result, physicians suffer from a
charge of negligence in a different way than does an errant driver in a no-
injury collision.
One fascinating set of studies found that physicians who had been sued were
significantly more likely to think of retiring early, to stop seeing patients whom
they perceived to be more likely to sue, and to tell their children not to practice
medicine. 210 The sued physicians were also much more likely to report severe
depressed mood, inner tension, anger, and frustration than the nonsued
physicians.211 In fact, a strong reaction of anger was "pervasive" among sued
physicians (87.9%),212 and they perceived themselves as scapegoats of the
legal profession.2 13  Yet, only 24.8% of the sued doctors had paid
settlements. 214 For the three-quarters who made no payment, it was the burden
of being charged and the task of exonerating themselves that had produced
their anger.215
On balance, therefore, unfounded malpractice claims do seem to carry
unique social and personal costs. They also impose costs on the legal system
beyond the expenses associated with filtering weak claims. When the mere
fact of being charged with negligence is seen as a form of punishment, then
tort law's deterrent signal is badly distorted. From this perspective,
207 See id. at 1852.
208 See, e.g., Brennan & Howard, supra note 73, at B7; Perlman, supra note 203, at 14.
209 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection ofCasesfor Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 365 (1991).
211 Sara C. Charles et al., Sued and Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported Reactions to
Malpractice Litigation, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 437, 437-38 (1985). They were also
significantly more likely to say that litigation caused suffering to them and their families.
Id. at 440.
211 Id. at 438. When they interviewed nonresponders, the researchers learned that many
had not completed the questionnaire because doing so was too emotionally disruptive. Id. at
440.
212 Charles et al., supra note 194, at 564 tbl.1, 565 (1984).
213 Id. at 565.
214 Charles et al., supra note 210, at 438.
215 Charles et al., supra note 194, at 565.
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punishment is inflicted upon the innocent and guilty alike: the fact that roughly
40% of all malpractice claims lack merit is highly damning and fuels the
perception that the system is irrational.216 These facts make the initial claims
process the weak link in the present adjudicatory process.
More must be done to eliminate the baseless cases quickly and to reduce the
emotional, financial, and professional costs borne by physicians as they await
eventual exoneration. Although lawmakers in several states have enacted
reforms intended to reduce this problem (such as statutes requiring plaintiffs to
obtain the support of a medical expert prior to filing their lawsuit or soon
thereafter, and statutes creating pretrial screening panels), 21 7 these measures do
not appear to have produced significant improvements. 218 Creative new ideas
are badly needed.
Unfortunately, the health court plan does not address this problem directly.
At best, it will speed up the process of reaching a final judgment. In fact, the
simplified claims process could make the problem of over-claiming worse
because it will offer patients a quick and easy way to obtain a free evaluation
of their claims, just as the creation of nonbinding malpractice screening panels
reportedly did in some states. 219 Under the health court plan, patients could
make these "what the heck" claims without the filtering that occurs when they
seek a lawyer who will take their case. A better way to protect physicians
from the pain inflicted by simply being drawn into the judicial process is to
eliminate individual liability and replace it with hospital enterprise liability.
This idea, called exclusive enterprise liability, was proposed over twenty years
ago and is discussed at greater length in Part III.
The health courts claims process is unlikely to materially reduce the level of
under-claiming. In fact, the proposed restrictions on damage recovery are
likely to make the problem worse. In addition, the plan is simply not designed
to reduce the level of over-claiming. Here, too, the reform is more likely to
make the problem worse, than to make it better.
C. The Quest for Improved Efficiency Through Procedural Simplification
Health court advocates believe their proposed administrative process will
resolve malpractice claims more quickly and cheaply.220 In some states,
medical malpractice cases currently linger for years before they are settled or
216 See Charles et al., supra note 210, at 440.
217 E.g., FLA. STAT. § 766.104(1) (2006) (requiring that the attorney filing the action has
a good faith belief that there has been negligence in the treatment of the claimant); GA.
CODE ANN. § 9-11-9. 1(a) (1998) (requiring a plaintiff to file with the complaint an expert's
affidavit setting forth at least one negligent act or omission).
218 See, e.g., FURROW ET AL., supra note 155, at 531-32.
219 Id. at 532.
220 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 467-68.
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tried.221 These long delays extract an emotional toll on both the claimants and
the defendant physicians. The delays also put some plaintiffs under substantial
financial pressure to settle quickly (and thus, cheaply) in order to pay their
accumulating medical and household bills. A faster process would be a
welcome improvement if it could also deliver fair outcomes.
Medical malpractice litigation is also extremely expensive. Lawyers and
expert witnesses for both sides must be paid, along with the insurer's claims
management staff. Court-ordered discovery and resolution of pretrial motions
run the bill up even further. As a result, less than fifty cents of every dollar
paid by physicians for their malpractice insurance ultimately goes to injured
patients.222 Most of the rest is consumed by the process of deciding which
patients should receive a payment. 223 This compares poorly with the fraction
of payments that go to injured parties in fields where the claimant need not
prove fault. For example, 70-80% of workers' compensation premiums reach
injured workers and 85-90% of the premiums paid for disability insurance
reach disabled policyholders.224 And medical malpractice litigation shares this
problem with other areas of technically or scientifically complex fault-based
litigation, such as disputes over defective product design.225  There, too,
creative solutions are badly needed. 226  As a consequence, malpractice
litigation's time and expense pose a very serious problem.
The health court plan tackles the dual problems of long delay and high cost
by substituting an administrative claims process for the complicated judicial
process that currently handles malpractice lawsuits. 227 Preliminary coverage
determinations will be made by the insurer as they currently are, but appeals
will go to specialized health court judges who are assisted by court-appointed
experts. 228 Although few other details of this administrative process have thus
far been revealed, the new regime cannot produce the savings that proponents
desire without a marked reduction in the costs associated with hired expert
witnesses, pretrial discovery, motion practice, and lawyer preparation. Only
by cutting these costly activities can the fault-based health court plan approach
the low level of administrative costs found in no-fault claims resolutions
processes, such as those used for workers' compensation and disability
insurance claims.229
221 See Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 26 (statement of
Michelle Mello).
222 Id. at 19 (statement of Michelle Mello).
223 Id. at 24-27 (statement of Michelle Mello).
224 Id. at 26 (statement of Michelle Mello).
225 O'Connell, supra note 53, at 752.
226 See id. at 826-29.
227 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 462-65.
228 Id. at 464.
229 See Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 26-27 (statement of
Michelle Mello).
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Unfortunately, cutting this pretrial preparation in a fault-based system is a
risky business. No-fault systems, such as workers' compensation insurance,
drastically reduce administrative costs because they eliminate the need to
prove or defend against allegations of fault.230 The elimination of that issue
dramatically reduces the money spent on expert witnesses and attorneys. It
also materially reduces the acrimony and emotional cost associated with the
claims process.
Fault-based systems, by contrast, must provide both parties with a fair
opportunity to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the claimed breach of
duty. Any attempt to produce the economies found in no-fault disputes within
a fault-based claims system will inevitably increase the risk of unjust verdicts.
Trimming procedural safeguards, such as the opportunity to do full discovery
and the opportunity to present favorable expert witnesses, is materially
different from the cost-savings produced by trimming issues, such as fault,
and, for obvious reasons, is far more likely to produce incorrect decisions.
Given the complexity of medical malpractice disputes, a fair process will
require most of the procedural protections that currently make malpractice
litigation expensive and lengthy.
1. The Important Choice Among Administrative Models
The fairness of the procedural protections provided by health courts will
turn on the choice that lawmakers make among the many administrative
models currently in use. At one end are the tribunals that resemble traditional
trial courts and provide opportunities for liberal discovery and significant
motion practice. 23 1 At the other end are administrative processes that provide
only minimal due process, such as license suspension proceedings, where
citizens are simply given notice and opportunities to tell their stories. 2
32 Most
administrative tribunals fall between those two models. Where health courts
fall on this continuum will help determine both the accuracy of their outcomes
and the savings, if any, that accrue from the switch to health courts.
Administrative courts are typically created as either the adjudicative arm of
an administrative agency, like the tribunals that adjudicate social security
disputes under the Social Security Administration, or as an independent
governmental entity, like the Court of Federal Claims.2 33 In the federal system,
230 Troyen A. Brennan & Michelle M. Mello, Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice: A
Case Study, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 267, 267 (2003) (acknowledging that the
administrative cost savings produced by no-fault programs come "largely by minimizing the
role of the lawyers").
231 ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 173-74 (2d ed.
2001).
232 See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 252-62; infra text accompanying notes 246-
255.
233 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2000); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 90-91 (3d ed. 1994); 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR
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both kinds of tribunals are sometimes called Article I courts because they are
created by Congress under Article I of the Constitution and are not part of the
judicial branch created under Article 111.234 However, the independent
tribunals created by Congress are quite different from the agency-associated
tribunals.
Independent Article I courts, such as the Court of Federal Claims2 35 are
created by Congress as freestanding bodies and strongly resemble judicial trial
courts. Indeed, the bankruptcy courts are even annexed to the federal district
courts. 23 6  Such courts have detailed rules of procedure patterned on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of bankruptcy courts,
procedures extensively tailored to the unique character of the disputes it
decides. 237 Substantial pretrial discovery and motion practice are the norm.238
Each side calls both fact and expert witnesses and cross-examination is a
matter of right.239 Except for the absence of a jury, litigation before these
administrative courts is very much like litigation in traditional civil courts. 240
It seems unlikely that the backers of health courts have this kind of
administrative tribunal in mind because this model would not be materially
cheaper or faster than civil courts.241 Nor would it be any less adversarial.
The second group of administrative courts is attached to an administrative
agency, such as the Social Security Administration or the Occupational Health
and Safety Administration (OSHA). 242 These tribunals resolve disputes arising
out of the business of the affiliated agency, such as disputes over eligibility for
social security or the violation of workplace safety rules. 243 Because these
tribunals have close ties to an executive branch agency, their proceedings are
often called agency adjudications244  or, less commonly, Article 11
proceedings .245
If lawmakers choose an agency adjudication model for health courts, then
they also must decide whether to subject the tribunal to the formal adjudication
R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4101 (2d ed.
1988).
234 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 233, at 90.
235 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 233, at § 4101.
236 Id. § 4106.
237 Id.
238 BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 6.04, at 6-
8 to -10 (1980).
239 Id. at 6-9 to -10.
240 Id. at 6-8.
241 See, e.g., Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 26-27 (statement
of Michelle Mello); Mello et al., supra note 9, at 462-65.
242 Bruff, supra note 135, at 345-47.
243 Id. at 346-47.
244 Id. at 359.
245 Id. at 329.
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procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or the equivalent
state statute.246 Tribunals that are not governed by the formal adjudication
procedures of a state or federal APA ordinarily provide fewer procedural
safeguards - sometimes no more than notice of the proceeding, an opportunity
to present evidence (though not necessarily in person), and an unbiased
decision maker. 247 No tribunal-assisted discovery takes place and the tribunal
can bar attorneys.248 The hearing officers have lower pay and less prestige
than the administrative law judges who sit in formal tribunals governed by the
APA.249 They also have less independence from agency pressures, such as the
pressure to move a large caseload quickly or to limit the number of claims
allowed.250 As one commentator observed, these informal tribunals are often
staffed by lower-caliber judges "who can tolerate life on the assembly line. 25 1
This model is unlikely to satisfy either doctors or their patients. In contrast,
adjudicative proceedings subject to the APA's formal adjudication procedures
tend to have higher stakes and more procedural safeguards. Unlike informal
proceedings, the parties are entitled to a formal hearing and can be
accompanied by an attomey. 252 Social security eligibility proceedings fit this
model.253
Although APA formal adjudication proceedings have more procedural
protections than informal proceedings, they lack many of the procedural
protections that are provided by the judicial process. For example, counsel can
only cross-examine an adverse witness in a formal adjudication proceeding if
the hearing officer feels that doing so is necessary "for a full and true
disclosure of the facts. ' 254 In practice, most agencies place material limits on
cross-examination. 255 Furthermore, testimony before the tribunal is often
246 Congress determines whether the federal APA applies. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESs 304 (4th ed. 2004). At a minimum, the process must
include notice, an opportunity to present evidence, and an unbiased decision-maker.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985); Memphis Light, Gas &
Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 13 (1978); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 173-74.
247 See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 254-62.
248 Id. at 173, 219.
249 In tribunals governed by the APA, the decision-maker is an "administrative law
judge." PIERCE ET AL., supra note 246, at 308. "Informal" adjudication not governed by the
APA is presided over by an "administrative judge." Id. at 309. The latter have much less
independence from the agency and lower pay. Id. at 309-10.
250 Bruff, supra note 135, at 349 (describing a controversial policy in the social security
disability benefits program).
251 Id. at 331.
252 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(2) (2000); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 220.
253 See AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 220.
254 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000); AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 220.
255 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 221.
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submitted in written form rather than by personal appearance. 256 In addition,
the APA does not require any opportunity for pretrial discovery 257 and the
Federal (or State) Rules of Evidence do not apply in administrative hearings.258
Instead, administrative tribunals freely admit hearsay evidence and commonly
take judicial notice of facts that are not in the record. 259 Consequently,
agencies can set their own policies over discovery and those policies vary
widely.260
Thus, administrative tribunals vary substantially in the procedural
protections they provide. The simpler the issue to be resolved and the larger
the volume of claims to be handled, the more simplified the decision-making
process tends to be. The higher the stakes and the more complex the issues to
be decided, the more that the administrative process resembles the judicial
process, especially in disputes like those involving tax compliance, where
individual fault is an important issue.
2. The Risks of Simplification
When advocates of health courts extol the simplicity and efficiency of their
proposed claims process, they fail to recognize the importance of procedural
protections. Procedural protections were established to produce more just
outcomes. 261 They were, in fact, a reaction to the unfairness associated with
more streamlined Victorian processes. 262
Until the middle third of the 20th century, American litigation had many of
the efficiencies sought today by the proponents of health courts. Virtually no
court-assisted discovery was permitted, expert witnesses were relatively
uncommon, and trial dates came quickly.263 The pleadings used to initiate a
lawsuit had to be highly detailed. 264 This probably reduced the risk of
256 See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal
Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 37; PIERCE ET AL., supra note 246, at 311.
257 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 219-20. Discovery is not constitutionally
required in administrative proceedings. Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
549 F.2d 28, 33 (7th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 857-58
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
258 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 221-34; PIERCE ET AL., supra note 246, at 310-
11.
259 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 229-30 (stating that the APA requires parties be
given the opportunity "to show the contrary" under 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (2000)); PIERCE ET
AL., supra note 246, at 311.
260 AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 231, at 219-20.
261 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 922-25 (1987).
262 Id. at 944.
263 Id. at 919.
264 See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1331, at 467 (3d ed. 2004).
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frivolous lawsuits. 265 Unfortunately, it also led to the dismissal of many
meritorious cases.266 The problem of unjust outcomes was especially great
when key evidence was possessed by the defendant or his associates. 267
Concern about unjust outcomes prompted enactment of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure (FRCP) in 1938.268 The express goal of the rules was to
decide more cases on their true merits.269 Among other things, the FRCP
introduced "notice pleading," 270 and court-sanctioned discovery blossomed.271
Both of these reforms were designed to delay the final disposition of a claim
until each of the parties had the opportunity to learn all of the facts known by
the other.272 The new system relies much less on the pleadings as a means of
identifying the issues and weeding out nonmeritorious cases, and much more
on greatly expanded discovery, summary judgment, and the pretrial
conference.
Under the modem rules, courts are still expected to identify and dispose of
unwarranted claims, but they do so more slowly, convinced that full
investigation of the facts leads to more informed and more just settlements and
verdicts. 273 As a result, trial judges rarely dismiss a case before considerable
discovery has taken place. 274 As explained by the Supreme Court in a 1976
antitrust case, where "'the proof is largely in the hands of the [defendants],...
dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should
be granted very sparingly. '275 These reforms of pleading and discovery made
it possible to redress wrongs that previously had been immunized by the
inability to reach evidence in the hands of the defendant.276
Administrative tribunals depart from this judicial model. They have
streamlined their procedures to process a large volume of claims at a
manageable cost.277 Literally millions of disputes over government benefits
265 See Subrin, supra note 261, at 917-18.
266 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 264, at 467.
267 See id. (commenting that these rules kept many meritorious suits out of court because
the pre-litigation investigation required to ascertain the necessary facts was impossible
under the limited rules of formal discovery then in effect).
261 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 253 (4th ed. 2005) (observing that most
states then followed suit).
269 Id. at 255.
270 FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2).
271 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 264, at 469.
272 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 268, at 254.
273 See id. at 254-55.
274 See id.
275 Hosp. Bldg. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957)).
276 See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 287 (5th ed. 2001).
277 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 233, at 90-91.
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are decided by administrative tribunals every year.278  A streamlined
adjudicative process enables the agencies to process these disputes efficiently
and, as long as the claims tend to be routine, at a tolerable risk of error. A
more expensive process is not typically warranted by the stakes.279 In some
instances, it would make claims resolution unavailable to many citizens.280 In
most of these expedited adjudicative processes, no determination of individual
fault needs to be made.281
3. Streamlining in Medical Malpractice Cases
An abbreviated administrative process would not be appropriate for the
resolution of controverted medical malpractice disputes. Court-assisted
discovery, in particular, is essential. An abbreviated discovery process would
inevitably rely far too heavily on the written medical records. Yet, lawyers on
both sides know that the hospital chart is often incomplete. 282 Mishaps are
omitted.283 In addition, many cases are tainted by suspicions that the chart has
been altered. 284 A truncated adjudicative process would exacerbate the already
strong temptation to doctor the records.
In addition, the doctors and nurses who treat a patient usually know far more
about the circumstances in dispute than the patient does. Yet, doctors and their
staff are notoriously unwilling to talk to their patients about adverse events. 285
As a result, patients often must file a lawsuit just to find out what went
wrong.286 The Physician Payment Review Commission acknowledged this
information asymmetry in its 1995 report to Congress, stating "[i]t is often
difficult to judge at a case's inception whether it is likely to be successful,
because key information often is not available in the medical record and must
be obtained through the legal process. '287 Malpractice defendants make
278 See id. at 378-79 (opining that government "would collapse under its own weight" if
full judicial process were required).
279 See id.
280 See AMAN &'MAYTON, supra note 231, at 118 n.3. Undue proceduralism could
deplete the resources intended for program beneficiaries. See Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 406 (1971).
281 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 233, at 379.
282 See Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for Studying Adverse Events in
Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309, 312 (1997).
283 See id. (implying that not all medical errors are recorded in medical charts).
284 See Michael J. Saks, Medical Malpractice: Facing Real Problems and Finding Real
Solutions, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 693, 709 (1994).
285 See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families To File Medical
Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1361 (1992).
286 See id.
287 PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS B-19 (1995)
(on file with author).
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powerful use of the information asymmetry that typically exists.2 88 One study
found that settlement offers were rarely made when patients used a hospital's
voluntary, informal complaint process.289 Instead, hospitals used the process
"to learn about the litigiousness of specific patients" and used "the filing of
lawsuits as a hurdle that patients must overcome in order to convince the
hospital that they are sufficiently litigious to justify a high settlement. '290
Another study found that settlement of cases with severe injuries never
occurred prior to the filing of a lawsuit.29' Often the defendant makes no offer
until the patient has retained an expert who will testify that the defendant
breached the standard of care. 292 Non-litigious patients are rarely compensated
- not even when the hospital believes that the patient has been injured by
medical negligence. 293 Their limited access to information and the hurdles that
they face in obtaining attorneys and experts place injured patients at a
significant disadvantage.
The civil justice system attempts to balance the scales. Claimants have the
right to representation by counsel and are encouraged to use it. Contingent
fees are allowed in order to give low-income patients equal access to counsel
and to justice. Modem discovery rules help plaintiffs pierce the veil of secrecy
surrounding the events that produced their injuries, enabling patients to obtain
information from recalcitrant witnesses. In addition, parties have the right to
cross-examine adverse witnesses and to offer witnesses of their own, including
experts. Because patients who sue generally lack the social and political
influence of the defendant doctors, the patients' rights are also protected by
having the civil justice system in its own independent branch of government
and by insisting that verdicts be rendered by a jury of the patients' peers. Each
of these protections is likely to be weakened or eliminated in the proposed shift
from civil courts to administrative health courts.
Like court-assisted discovery, the role afforded plaintiffs' counsel will be
very important. Proponents of the health court plan have occasionally
expressed their hope and expectation that patients will be able to resolve their
claims without an attorney.294 They have even suggested that patients whose
288 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15
RAND J. OF ECON. 404, 409 (1984).
289 Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute
Resolution in Medical Malpractice, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 777, 789 (1994) (37 of 355 claims).
290 Id. at 778. These "empirical results are consistent with an information structure in
which patients initially are poorly informed about the quality of medical care and the
hospital initially is poorly informed about how litigious patients are." Id. at 806.
291 Roger A. Rosenblatt & Andy Hurst, An Analysis of Closed Obstetric Malpractice
Claims, 74 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 710, 711 (1989).
292 Id. at 712.
293 See Farber & White, supra note 185, at 795. The goal is to avoid settling with the
"peaceful" patients who will not file suit. Id.
294 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 462-63.
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claims are initially rejected by an insurer will appeal their decisions to the
health court without the assistance of counsel. 295 Apparently, proponents
assume the health court judge, with assistance from the court-appointed
expert(s), will be able to rule fairly on the claim using the record prepared by
the insurance company. This assumption is breathtakingly naive. Physicians,
hospitals, and malpractice insurers will, of course, be represented by
experienced counsel and insurance adjusters. They will use this advice to
design their initial claims procedures and also their strategy before the health
court. Unfair overreaching will be routine if patients are not encouraged to
retain counsel themselves.
Proponents would also like to cap the fees of legal counsel who represent
plaintiffs. Thus, a brochure promoting health courts says that attorneys' fees
will be "held to 20 percent. '296 No similar cap is proposed for the fees of
defense counsel.297 This proposal is presumably premised on the assumption
that plaintiffs' attorneys will have far less work to do in the new regime and,
thus, will be unable to justify their high contingent fees. However, the process
of investigating and proving a malpractice claim is unlikely to become so
inexpensive and risk-free that experienced and successful plaintiffs' attorneys
will be willing to stay in a field that offers them zero payment when they lose
and only 20% when they win. Thus, a cap will likely diminish the quality of
lawyers willing to represent malpractice plaintiffs and reduce the thoroughness
of representation provided by these attorneys. 298 Counsel will be less likely to
accept cases that require substantial investigation to evaluate their merits.
Caps on attorneys' fees, in short, would be unjust to injured patients. If justice
is the goal, then thorough representation by experienced counsel should be
strongly encouraged.
Finally, the parties should be permitted to call a limited number of their own
experts. The physicians asked to serve as court-appointed experts are likely to
use their own clinical practices as the benchmark against which others should
be judged.299 Occasionally, however, their personal clinical choices will not
coincide with the "best practices" required by the "avoidability" standard of
care.30 0 Hearing multiple expert opinions will help the trial judge construct a
295 See id. at 465.
296 COMMON GOOD INST., AN URGENT CALL FOR SPECIAL HEALTH COURTS 6 (2005),
available at http://cgood.org/assets/attachments/130.pdf.
297 See generally Mello et al., supra note 9.
298 Patricia Munch Danzon & Lee A. Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 345, 363 (1983).
299 See William Meadow, Operationalizing the Standard of Medical Care: Uses and
Limitations of Epidemiology To Guide Expert Testimony in Medical Negligence Allegations,
37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 675, 676 (2002) (calling this "so obvious as to almost go without
saying"); Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking
Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 711 (2002) (stating that physicians do this
"covertly").
300 Meadow, supra note 299, at 688.
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more accurate and sophisticated picture of existing medical opinion. In
addition, the risk that court-appointed experts will be biased in favor of their
fellow physicians provides an independently sufficient reason to allow
plaintiffs to call a limited number of expert witnesses.
4. Synthesis
Health courts should not be created until the sponsors provide concrete
assurances that such courts will employ procedures like those used in full
Article I administrative courts. These protections should include the
opportunity to do meaningful discovery, to present witnesses (including at least
one expert on liability) and to cross-examine all adverse witnesses including
court-appointed experts. It is impossible to overstate the importance of these
provisions. Without these safeguards, the transfer of medical malpractice
claims to a streamlined administrative tribunal will undo a century of judicial
reforms designed to insure cases are decided on the merits.
Unfortunately, this level of procedural protection will substantially reduce
the time and cost savings proponents hope health courts will provide.30 1 If
reformers want a considerably faster and less adversarial process, they will
need to eliminate the element of fault. In a no-fault system, like first-party
disability insurance and third-party workers' compensation coverage,
claimants need not prove that their injuries were caused by anyone else's
fault. 302 Foregoing proof of fault eliminates protracted litigation to determine
the appropriate standard of care, which often requires deposing multiple
experts scattered across the country.30 3 A no-fault system also eliminates the
extended fact-finding often necessary to determine which provider, if any,
failed to comply with that standard. 30 4 Eliminating litigation over the issue of
fault makes large administrative savings possible. But as long as litigation
over the issue of fault is retained, only a very modest amount of streamlining
will be possible.
The accuracy and fairness of a health court regime will turn heavily on the
procedural protections that it incorporates. The stronger the procedural
protections, the stronger the claim that health courts provide a fair alternative
to civil courts. Although including these safeguards will reduce the cost
savings achieved, their inclusion will repay those financial costs with superior
justice.
D. Producing More Consistent Damage Awards Through Scheduling
The health court proposal creates a schedule for pain and suffering damages
which calibrates the size of the plaintiffs recovery for non-economic harm to
301 However, an argument could certainly be made for a separate, more simplified
process for the handling of small claims.
302 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
303 See Keeton, supra note 53, at 594.
304 See id.
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match the severity of her injuries. 30 5 This reform has the potential to greatly
improve the consistency and horizontal fairness of damage awards because like
cases would be treated more alike. 30 6 While lawmakers could simply impose
this reform onto the existing court structure, that idea currently has little
legislative support. As a result, the health courts proposal would provide a
welcome opportunity to test the idea.
In addition, a damages schedule would satisfy critics who think that a
ceiling must be set on pain and suffering recovery in order to prevent
"excessive" awards. 30 7 Unlike state tort reforms that impose a single pain and
suffering cap for all injuries, however, a damages schedule would account for
severity. 30 8 This is a considerable improvement.
Nevertheless, the task of producing the schedule will be fraught with all the
difficulties that have bedeviled the drafters of uniform sentencing laws. Hard
decisions will need to be made about the criteria to consider when classifying
the severity of injuries, the amount of damages to allow for each classification,
and the permissibility of departing entirely from the approved verdict range in
extreme or unique cases. Too little discretion creates the risk that materially
different cases will be treated as if they were alike. Too much discretion
introduces the risk that awards will vary considerably from judge to judge.
The most troubling danger a damages schedule poses is the risk that the level
of damages will be unconscionably low. The woefully incomplete recoveries
provided under most state workers' compensation plans illustrate the danger. 30 9
Drafters should therefore base their initial schedules on the size of jury awards
in cases with similar injuries and then include an annual inflation adjustment.
Even then, however, the adequacy of these awards will be vulnerable to
erosion every time physicians march on the state capital. Surprisingly, the
authors of the health court plan seem to anticipate and welcome this kind of
revision: through periodic legislative assessment, they state, "we can ensure
that the amount we spend on medical injury compensation matches social
judgments about how much we should be spending." 310 This is a genuinely
frightening idea that completely misunderstands the role and function of
compensatory damages.
305 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 468 (crediting a damages proposal by Bovbjerg,
Sloan, and Blumstein in 1989).
306 E.g., David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to
Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256, 259 (1989) (arguing that awards for pain and suffering vary
significantly and inexplicably).
307 See, e.g., Mello et al., supra note 9, at 467-68.
308 Id. at 468, 470.
309 See Joanne Doroshow, The Health Courts Facade, 42 TRIAL 20, 22 (2006) (explaining
that these plans fail to fully compensate even for lost pre-injury income and lamenting that
statutory damage schedules are subject to reduction over time by legislation).
310 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 470.
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As with other tort recoveries, malpractice awards are designed to
accomplish corrective justice by making the negligently injured patient whole.
Judges and juries resolving tort disputes decide whether the costs associated
with an injury should be born by the injured individual or by the person who
caused the injuries. When the harm has been caused by someone's negligence,
then our norms and laws currently dictate that the negligent party should bear
the loss, rather than an innocent victim. Capping recovery below full
compensation would unfairly shift the costs of health care accidents away from
the individuals and organizations that negligently cause them and onto the
innocent patients who suffer them. By capping recovery, a damages schedule
would force negligently injured patients to subsidize health care costs for the
rest of us, producing both an underinvestment in safety and unfair allocation of
accident costs. As long as the system is fault-based, physicians ought to make
their innocent victims whole, at least insofar as the harm caused can be fairly
ascertained in monetary terms.
The risk that damage levels will be set far too low casts a shadow on an
otherwise worthy idea. Despite the difficulty of the task, however, the
potential benefits of a damages schedule justify a pilot experiment. A final
verdict on this reform must await concrete details about the size and basis of
the contemplated awards.
E. The Likelihood of Spurring Improvements in Patient Safety
Proponents of the Common Good health court plan strongly believe that the
shift from trial courts to health courts will lead to significant improvements in
the safety of medical care.311 Indeed, patient safety is the benefit that they
emphasize most.3 12 This emphasis is not misplaced. Several of the proposed
changes have the potential to improve patient safety. These include the
adoption of a new and tougher standard of care, the centralized collection of
accident data, and the production of clearer ex ante standards of care.3 13
However, the plan is unlikely to deliver the safety benefit that patient safety
advocates covet most - greater physician disclosure of errors. 314  To
accomplish that fundamental objective will require either an increase in the
willingness of physicians to participate in organization-wide safety efforts or
the adoption of hospital enterprise liability - perhaps both.
Courts and legal scholars have long assumed the threat of malpractice
liability gives physicians a concrete incentive to provide competent care.315
Despite several attempts to detect a deterrent impact there is no reliable
311 See, e.g., id.
312 Id.; Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 45 (statement of Paul
Barringer, General Counsel, Common Good).
313 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 468-71.
314 See Hickson et al., supra note 285, at 1361-62.
315 See Mello & Brennan, supra note 62, at 1597-98.
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evidence to substantiate this assumption. 316 Though these efforts are beset
with methodological obstacles, it is nonetheless both disappointing and telling
that no reliable evidence of safety improvements has surfaced.317
There are probably several explanations for the weakness of deterrence in
the field of medical malpractice. First, physicians buy malpractice insurance to
insulate themselves from tort damages. Because their premiums are not
ordinarily experience-rated, 318 this insurance immunizes them from the direct
consequences of a jury award. Second, very few negligently injured patients
file claims, diluting the legal incentive to adopt best practices. 319 Third, the
judicial system fails to give doctors clear guidance about the clinical practices
that will satisfy the legal standard of care, making it difficult for them to
comply even if they want to do so. 320 Finally, and most importantly, most
physicians believe that the odds of being sued are unrelated to the quality of
treatment provided and the legal system does not recognize or exonerate the
practice of good medicine. 321  Given the lack of concrete evidence that
malpractice liability leads to improvements in patient safety and the
widespread uncertainty about what the law requires, policy makers are obliged
to take seriously the claim that health courts can do better.
The Institute of Medicine goes further, arguing not only that malpractice law
fails to encourage good medicine, but also that it discourages physician
cooperation with patient safety initiatives. 322  Patient safety advocates
persuasively argue that open discussion of errors is a necessary precursor to
systematic safety improvements. 323  They believe the fear of lawsuits
discourages doctors from disclosing their own errors and participating in these
discussions. 324 In addition, the perception that lawsuits are random makes it
hard to convince physicians that safety initiatives will pay legal dividends.325
These realities have prompted most patient safety advocates to conclude that
316 See id.
"' See id. at 1607-13.
318 Id. at 1616.
319 Id. at 1618. In addition, the combination of a very low claims rate among people with
valid claims and a high number of baseless claims sends a distorted deterrence signal to
providers. Id. at 1620. Moreover, insufficient claiming insufficiently internalizes for
physicians the damages caused by poor medicine. Id.
320 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 469.
321 See Mello & Brennan, supra note 62, at 1619 (discussing the "incredibly small
overlap between the group of patients injured by negligence and the group who brought
suit").
322 INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN 43 (2000).
323 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 472 ("[H]onesty about potential problems will both
promote overall discussion and reiterate to the professional that the patient's well-being is
the first objective.").
324 Id. at 473.
325 See WEILER ET AL., supra note 8, at 129.
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malpractice reform is an essential predicate to fundamentally improving patient
safety.326
To rebut this argument, opponents of malpractice reform typically point to
the dramatic safety improvements made in anesthesiology over the past twenty
years.327 They cite these improvements as proof that the incentives created by
malpractice liability can and do improve patient safety.328 Premiums in that
specialty went from the high end of the industry to the low end as the result of
a concerted effort to reduce both accidents and lawsuits. 329
The transformation of anesthesiology was certainly a splendid illustration of
tort's deterrent power. Sadly, it is also a rare one. Furthermore, that
transformation would not have taken place if the Harvard teaching hospitals
had not adopted a voluntary version of enterprise liability. Part III explains
why enterprise liability is far more likely to lead to safety improvements than
individual liability. Individual physician liability has yet to produce any
similarly striking examples of malpractice-motivated patient safety
improvement.
The health court plan proposes to end this drought not by incorporating
enterprise liability, but by making several other changes to existing tort law.
The first is a shift in the standard of care from customary medical practice to
state-of-the-art practice. 330 The drafters call this standard an "avoidability"
standard because it will allow recovery by all patients whose injuries could
have been avoided by the use of best practices.331 Second, health courts will
provide physicians with better ex ante guidance about the clinical practices that
are required by the new standard of care, making it easier for physicians to
respond appropriately to tort law's incentives.332 Third, sponsors believe that
the simplified claims process associated with their plan will make claiming
easier and, thus, make malpractice law's deterrent signal more robust.
333
Fourth, proponents believe reliance on specialized judges and neutral experts
will erode physicians' fears about undeserved liability and, thus, lead them to
more openly discuss their medical mistakes and to cooperate with system-wide
326 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 470-7 1.
327 John H. Eichhorn et al., Standards for Patient Monitoring During Anesthesia at
Harvard Medical School, 256 JAMA 1017, 1020 (1986).
328 See id.
329 See infra text accompanying notes 406-411.
330 Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 43-47 (statements of James
M. Wootton & Paul Barringer).
331 Id. at 43, 46, 47 (statements of James M. Wootton & Paul Barringer). That label is
used because it imposes liability whenever the injuries suffered by the patient could have
been avoided using state-of-the-art practices. Mello et al., supra note 9, at 474.
332 Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 47 (statements of James M.
Wootton & Paul Barringer).
333 Id. at 46 (statements of James M. Wootton & Paul Barringer).
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efforts to prevent medical accidents. 334 Finally, the claims data that will be
gathered by the health court can be used to detect recurring problems and to
design ways to prevent them. 335 Each of these potential improvements will be
addressed in turn.
1. The Avoidability Standard of Care
The proposed change from a custom-based standard of care to a state-of-the-
art standard is intended to raise the level of quality that physicians expect of
themselves. 336 Proposing this change was politically brave; studies repeatedly
show that practicing physicians are slow to adopt important improvements in
treatment. 337  However, the new standard's clinical effect will likely be
tempered by one of the obstacles that also limits the deterrent effect of existing
malpractice law. Under the health courts plan, individual physicians will bear
liability, rather than the larger health care enterprises in which physicians
function.338 Yet, liability insurance for physicians is not experience-rated. 339
As a result, the legal incentive for physicians to raise their level of practice will
be tempered significantly. While the proposed "avoidability" standard is a
welcome reform, its impact on clinical practices and patient safety is likely to
be tempered by these shortcomings.
2. Better Ex Ante Guidance
The health court plan aims to improve patient safety by giving practicing
physicians a clearer idea of the clinical practices that will satisfy the legal
standard of care.340 Physicians will then be able to conform their practices to
the legal standard, producing both state-of-the-art medical care and a marked
reduction in malpractice exposure. 34 1 Several features of health courts are
intended to contribute to this goal. 342 One is that all health court decisions will
be published and will be binding precedents in future cases.343 These past
decisions will provide physicians with valuable guidance about the way similar
314 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 472-73.
131 Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 46 (statements of James M.
Wootton & Paul Barringer).
336 See John E. Wennberg & Philip G. Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations in the Quality
of Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 925, 938 (2002).
331 See, e.g., id. at 927-28 (citing as an example the systematic under use of beta-
blockers).
338 See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 47, at 1387 & n. 116.
339 See Mello & Brennan, supra note 62, at 1617-18.
340 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 461.
341 See Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 46-47 (statement of
Paul Barringer).
342 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 468-69.
343 Id. at 465.
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cases will be decided in the future. By contrast, jury verdicts come with no
explanation and, at any rate, do not bind future juries. In addition, all
malpractice cases in a given jurisdiction will be decided by a single judge or
set of judges.344 More consistent and predictable outcomes may well result.
Finally, the sponsors also propose that health courts give more weight to
specialty board practice guidelines than trial courts currently do.34 5 Together,
these features could make it easier for practicing physicians to discem the
standard of care in advance and to match their behavior to it.
3. Claiming by More Victims of Negligence
Health courts could also improve deterrence by increasing the number of
claims made by deserving patients. Proponents believe that simplification of
the claims process will produce more claims, thus strengthening the deterrent
signal. 346 Once again, the authors of the health court proposal deserve to be
congratulated for honestly addressing a serious shortcoming of the current
system, even though doing so could cost them some support from physicians.
As the earlier discussion of under-claiming explained, 347 however, any net
increase in claiming and recovery by negligently-injured patients is likely to be
modest because the elimination of recovery for expenses paid by collateral
sources will make the claims process less attractive and less realistic for many
injured patients. 348
4. Centralized Data Collection
Specialized health courts would also improve patient safety by creating a
central repository of information about iatrogenic injury.349  Malpractice
claims files could provide public health researchers with detailed information
about the kinds of injuries and clinical practices that most often produce
significant iatrogenic injury. These data could then be examined to identify
root causes and fix them. No similar data bank currently exists in the United
States. Although the national hospital accrediting agency, several states, and a
34 See Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 46-47 (statement of
Paul Barringer).
"I See id. at 47.
346 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 471. This rosy scenario also seems to assume that
patients will be better able to sort legitimate claims from unwarranted ones. Otherwise, the
extra claims would simply produce more static. It is not clear why this would be so, unless
we assume that physicians and nurses will guide patients' decisions. I explain in the text
why this is unlikely to occur as long as providers risk individual liability. The new standard
of care will, of course, mean that an unknown fraction of currently marginal or weak claims
will become legally compensable.
347 See supra text at notes 175-187.
348 See supra text at notes 175-187.
141 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 476.
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number of hospitals have their own reporting requirements, 350 none have been
able to generate the volume of data desired by patient safety advocates. 35'
Public health researchers are understandably hungry to collect these data.
Better information about the causes of medical injury will improve patient
safety. Because most doctors are unwilling to disclose their medical accidents
and errors voluntarily,352 the lawsuits filed against them could provide a useful
substitute.
However, the usefulness of these data should not be overstated. It will only
shed light on the small subset of negligently-inflicted injuries that result in the
filing of a claim for damages. This is a notoriously tiny and unrepresentative
subset of iatrogenic injuries and it contains no information whatsoever about
practices that commonly produce "near-misses." Still, similar data have
apparently been useful in other countries.353 As a result, it is possible that this
data set could be used to reduce iatrogenic injuries here.
5. Fostering Disclosure by Physicians
It seems reasonable to assume that creating a new health court system could
initially reduce physician anxiety about the fairness of malpractice
adjudication. Specialized judges would replace juries.354  Court-appointed,
independent medical experts would either replace or supplement experts hired
by the parties. 355  Credible practice guidelines would be given binding
authority.356 Written judicial decisions would provide concrete guidance for
future clinical practice.357 Damages would be capped.358 All of these things
could improve physician confidence. The sponsors of the health courts
proposal hope this confidence will lead to greater physician participation in
safety improvement efforts, including more open disclosure of errors.359
Health court backers also believe the new "avoidability" standard of care
will make it easier for physicians to talk about their mistakes. 360 When
patients sue, they will merely allege that an "avoidable" injury occurred, not
350 See Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 44, 54, 55, 76
(statements of Paul Barringer, Margaret VanAmringe, and Joanne Doroshow); WEILER ET
AL., supra note 8, at 33-59.
351 See Innovative Solutions to Medical Liability, supra note 7, at 44, 54, 55.
352 See id. at 27.
353 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 478-82 (contending that benefits have accrued in
other countries which have adopted administrative claims processes).
354 Id. at 464.
311 Id. at 465.
356 Id. at 461,471.
317 Id. at 465.
358 Id. at 467-68.
319 Id. at 472-74.
360 See id. at 474.
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that the physician was negligent or incompetent."' Because the "avoidability"
standard lacks any explicit reference to culpability - indeed, it lacks any moral
connotation whatsoever - patient safety advocates hope that it will produce
less psychological resistance to the disclosure of bad outcomes. 362 Supporters
also believe that specialized health courts, by virtue of their expertise, will
reduce the nearly universal distrust that physicians have towards the system of
justice. 363 This distrust produces a culture of defensiveness that impedes efforts
to improve quality. 364  Consequently, health court backers believe that
physician resistance to the open disclosure of accidents and near misses will
loosen substantially once their liability is governed by the proposed health
court plan.365
Sadly, these hopes are unlikely to bear fruit. Health court advocates ignore
strong evidence that a far more dramatic transformation in either physician
culture or malpractice doctrine will be necessary to prompt physicians to talk
freely about their mistakes. 366 Yet, health court advocates hardly waited for
the ink to dry on this law before ramping up their efforts to enact health court
legislation.367 This impatience suggests deep pessimism about the likelihood
that the new safe harbor for safety discussions will shake physicians out
of their fortress mentality.
The most powerful evidence supporting this pessimistic conclusion is the
failure of the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act 368 to remedy the
nondisclosure problem. In its exhaustive and crucial study of medical
mistakes, To Err Is Human,369 the Institute of Medicine concluded medicine
would not enjoy the degree of disclosure necessary for substantial
improvements in patient safety until practicing physicians were certain their
disclosures could not be used against them by tort plaintiffs. 370 As a result, the
first legal reform requested by the patient safety movement was legislation to
361 See id.
362 See id. It is also possible that an adverse verdict under the new standard will not lead
to the same harmful professional consequences associated with a finding of negligence. Id.
363 Medical Liability: New Ideas for Making the System Work Better for Patients, supra
note 7, at 41, 42 (statement of Philip K. Howard).
364 Mello et al., supra note 9, at 473.
365 Id. at 473-74.
366 Thomas H. Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully: How Physicians Would
Disclose Harmful Medical Errors to Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1585, 1591-92
(2006) [hereinafter Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully].
367 Congress passed the Patient Safety Quality Improvement Act in 2005. Pub. L. No.
109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 299b-22 to 299c (2007)). A revamped
Health Courts proposal came out the next year. See generally Mello et al., supra note 9.
368 Pub. L. No. 109-41.
369 INST. OF MED., To ERR Is HUMAN (2000).
370 Id. at 87.
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make these disclosures confidential. 371 Congress promptly responded, giving
physicians precisely the assurances they had requested. 37 2 Yet, the new law
did not solve the problem of physician silence; frustrated patient-safety
advocates are now searching for a better way to make physicians talk. 37 3
This failure is hardly surprising. Medical sociologists and psychologists
have found that physicians have difficulty recognizing their own errors, much
less disclosing them to others.374 Errors threaten physicians' self-esteem and
potentially expose them to peer stigma and loss of autonomy and authority. 375
Even before modem malpractice litigation emerged in the 1 960s, those dangers
made physicians very reluctant to report mishaps. 376  Interestingly, these
professional barriers also operate in countries where malpractice litigation has
not expanded like ours. Canadian physicians, for example, are sued
approximately one quarter as frequently as American doctors. 377  Yet,
Canadian physicians are only somewhat more supportive of disclosing serious
errors to patients than U.S. physicians are, 378 and they are no more likely to
report having actually disclosed any.3 79 When patients from the two countries
were asked about disclosure, they were equally likely to report that their
doctors failed to disclose a medical mistake.380 The researchers concluded that
"US tort reform, while potentially desirable for other reasons, may have
limited effect on physicians' disclosure attitudes and practices" because "the
malpractice environment may not be the major determinant" of physician
reluctance to disclose. 381  Instead, disclosure practices "may relate to the
norms, values, and practices that constitute the culture of medicine. 382
It will take more than a specialized, nonjury tribunal to transform physician
disclosure practices. Ideally, the change will be triggered by a paradigm shift
in medical culture. 383 In order for a legal reform to have that effect, it will
371 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 299b-22 to 299c (2005).
372 See Id. § 299b-22.
373 See generally Mello et al., supra note 9.
374 See, e.g., Ralph Peeples, Catherine T. Harris & Thomas Metzloff, Settlement Has
Many Faces: Physicians, Attorneys, and Medical Malpractice, 41 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV.
333, 341 (2000).
375 Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully, supra note 366, at 1585.
376 See Mello et al., supra note 9, at 473.
317 Thomas H. Gallagher et al., US and Canadian Physicians'Attitudes and Experiences
Regarding Disclosing Errors to Patients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1605, 1606 (2006)
[hereinafter Gallagher et al., US and Canadian Physicians].
378 Id. at 1609.
379 Id. at 1605, 1607.
380 Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully, supra note 366, at 1592.
381 Gallagher et al., US and Canadian Physicians, supra note 377, at 1609.
382 Id.
383 Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully, supra note 366, at 1592. 50% of
physicians deny that systemic errors cause most medical errors. See Gallagher et al., US
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need to offer physicians considerably greater insulation from liability costs
than health courts do. Something like exclusive hospital enterprise liability
will be needed if we really want physicians to talk openly about errors. Even
then, however, the psychological, cultural, and professional costs associated
with disclosure will continue to make disclosure painful. Given that reality,
the shift from jury trials to specialized health courts simply will not be
sufficient to produce a material change in physician disclosure, no matter how
benign the label given to the new standard of care.3
84
6. Synthesis
Several provisions in the health court plan could potentially improve patient
safety. Most promising among them are the state-of-the-art standard of care,
the centralized collection of data on medical accidents, and clearer ex ante
standards of care. However, the deterrence benefits expected from the
simplified claims procedure will likely be offset by the disincentives to
claiming associated with abrogation of the collateral source rule. Furthermore,
health courts are unlikely to lead to more robust disclosure of medical errors by
physicians. That change will require either a major transformation of
physician culture or adoption of hospital enterprise liability - perhaps both.
III. THE ADVANTAGES OF ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
The most disappointing aspect of the health courts proposal is not what it
includes, but what it omits. Hospital enterprise liability has far more potential
to significantly improve patient safety than does any aspect of the current
health court plan. Enterprise liability is also more likely than health courts are
to reduce the extraordinary fear and anger that physicians feel today. As a
result, enterprise liability is truly the elephant in the room.
Enterprise liability would change existing law by making hospitals
vicariously liable for the torts of physicians working within the hospital.385
Today, physicians who are not hospital-based are ordinarily treated as
and Canadian Physicians, supra note 377, at 1610. Others studies have confirmed the
widespread perception that physicians resist the modem tools of quality improvement such
as outcome reviews, data sharing, and collective design of safer systems. Anne-Marie J.
Audet et al., Measure, Learn, and Improve: Physicians' Involvement in Quality
Improvement, 24 HEALTH AFF. 843, 850 (2005); see also Michael D. Cabana et al., Why
Don't Physicians Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines? A Framework for Improvement, 282
JAMA 1458, 1458 (1999); Arnold Milstein & Nancy E. Adler, Out of Sight, Out of Mind:
Why Doesn't Widespread Clinical Quality Failure Command Our Attention?, 22 HEALTH
AFF. 119, 124 (2003).
384 Under a health courts regime, physicians would still buy their liability insurance and
would still be individually liable for injuries they inflict. Their disclosures of error to
hospital or national quality improvement programs would be no more confidential than they
already are.
385 Newhouse & Weiler, supra note 61, at 81.
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independent contractors, rather than as agents or employees of the hospital. 386
Hospitals therefore escape vicarious liability for the errors of most attending
physicians.
In most other fields of tort law, such as manufacturer liability for defective
products and merchant liability for slip-and-fall accidents, the business entity
that delivers the services is vicariously liable for the errors of its workforce.387
Home gardeners who are hurt by a defective weed-eater sue the manufacturer,
not the assembly line worker whose mistake caused the malfunction. Shoppers
who fall on a slippery floor in the grocery store typically sue the store, not the
janitor. In the rare instances when individual workers are named in lawsuits,
their employers routinely represent them and hold them harmless. 388 Liability
for individual error is not merely shared by the worker with the enterprise; it is
shifted entirely from the individual to the larger business entity.
Health care has always been different. Unlike assembly line workers and
even highly-trained professionals like airline pilots, physicians have
historically been treated by the law as independent contractors, not as
employees. 389 Physicians have long favored this categorization because they
value the independence associated with this status.390 A century ago, when
physicians feared that corporate employment of physicians would threaten the
prevailing model of private practice, they successfully lobbied for enactment of
"corporate practice" prohibitions. 391 They have resisted corporate influence
ever since - most recently in their successful alliance with patients to limit the
power of managed care organizations. 392 However, their independence has a
cost. It seems reasonable to suspect that physicians are named as defendants
far more often than people who work in most other trades or professions.
Health care's unique structural arrangements produce two significant
drawbacks that are relevant here. First, hospitals do not have the same legal
incentive to minimize accidents that other businesses do, like airlines and auto
manufacturers. 393 Second, the absence of exclusive organizational liability
386 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 155, at 374-76. Some, but not all, states have begun
to impose vicarious liability on hospitals for the conduct of physicians who are exclusively
hospital-based and who are selected by the hospital, rather than the patient - such as many
emergency medicine doctors and anesthesiology departments - using a theory of ostensible
or apparent agency. Id. at 377-78. However, that legal theory won't support liability for the
torts of physicians who are chosen by patients outside of the hospital. Id. at 376.
387 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 910-17 (2000) (explaining that the
negligence must occur within the scope of employment).
388 I base this statement on my experience as a tort defense attorney.
389 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 155, at 374, 376; see also DOBBS, supra note 387, at
917.
390 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 125-26.
391 See Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 431, 445-46 (1988).
392 Id.
393 See 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 118 n. 14.
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deprives physicians of the buffer protecting most workers from the financial
and emotional burdens of being a target defendant.394 Predictably, practicing
physicians bear an animosity toward tort law and plaintiffs' lawyers that is
unmatched in any other trade or profession.
Juxtaposed against this history of individualism is the emphasis today's
patient safety advocates place on building safer medical systems, rather than
focusing exclusively on the performance of individuals. Safety advocates
believe that the greatest improvements in patient safety will come from greater
attention to the processes by which health care is delivered.395 They point out
that a large fraction of the injuries that occur in hospitals are due to system
breakdown. 396  Greater attention to the system of delivery, rather than
individual errors, would enable hospitals and safety researchers to identify
those stages of the process at which errors are most common and to redesign
those stages to make errors both less common and more swiftly corrected.
Accomplishing this objective requires both the capacity and the willingness to
look at the entire delivery system, from patient arrival to patient departure.
Hospitals are better situated to accomplish this than individual physicians. 397
Yet, today's system of individual physician liability greatly reduces the
hospital's legal incentive to take the necessary steps and then weather the
inevitable backlash from physicians about interference with their discretion.
Exclusive hospital enterprise liability could produce that incentive.398
The existing hole in the law governing medical accidents not only limits its
deterrent effect, but also impairs its ability to justly compensate patients whose
accidents were avoidable. As long as physician liability is an individual
matter, patients who are injured in medical accidents that could have been
avoided through state-of-the-art cooperation between the providers and the
hospital will continue to lack a legal remedy. Enterprise liability will close
that hole.
In addition, the deterrent effect of enterprise liability is less subject to
dilution by the purchase of liability insurance than is individual physician
391 See id. at 121.
395 See Mello & Brennan, supra note 62, at 1623.
396 See id.
397 Hospital enterprise liability is, therefore, consistent with models favored by legal
economists, like Guido Calabresi, who suggested that the law should impose liability on the
party best positioned to see safety issues, including the relevant trade-offs, and to take
appropriate measures to prevent accidents or to induce others to prevent accidents. See
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135-73
(1970). He called parties in this position "the cheapest cost avoiders." Id. at 135 n.l.
Hospitals undoubtedly play this role in the delivery of in-patient health care.
398 There is limited empirical evidence suggesting that hospitals are more responsive than
physicians to the deterrence signals transmitted by tort law. See Troyen A. Brennan, The
Role of Regulation in Quality Improvement, 76 MILBANK Q. 709, 721 (1998).
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liability. Hospitals, unlike individual physicians, can be experience-rated. 399
Experience-rating creates a powerful incentive to reduce accidents. In the field
of workers' compensation insurance, for example, it has reduced the number of
workplace fatalities by more than 25%.400 Health care causes far too many
accidental injuries to waste this potential.
Enterprise liability would also more optimally use the resources that
hospitals can bring to the patient-safety mission. Michelle Mello and Troyen
Brennan offered the following frank assessment: "only institutions can muster
the resources to bring about systematic improvements in patient safety." 401
Enterprise liability would give institutions an incentive to do so.
Other industries, like aviation and automobile manufacture, have responded
to this incentive by making extraordinarily successful use of modem quality
improvement theory and its emphasis on systems design, rather than individual
fault.402 Each has focused on system-wide strategies such as better monitoring
of errors, thorough data analysis, examination of hand-offs and multi-person
processes, and the accommodation of foreseeable human error.40 3  As a
practical matter, each of these industries operates under the incentives of a
system in which the enterprise bears all of the costs of legal liability. Thus,
"no-one expects that the pilots or machinists working for an airline firm would
personally pay a substantial premium for insurance against their own instances
of careless behavior.' '404  By contrast, "roughly three-quarters of all
malpractice claims are now brought against physicians and other individual
providers. 405
Enterprise liability's deterrent power is most poignantly illustrated by the
miraculous reduction in anesthesia accidents that occurred at the end of the
twentieth century. It happened because all of the physicians in Harvard
Medical School's Department of Anesthesia were insured by Harvard's own
medical malpractice insurance company. 406 Anxious to bring down the
payouts being made for injuries occurring in the anesthesia departments of
Harvard's nine teaching hospitals, the insurer's risk managers asked the
399 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 123-24; Mello & Brennan,
supra note 62, at 1617-18, 1633.
400 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 506-07 (citing MICHAEL J.
MOORE & W. Kip Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS'
COMPENSATION, AND PRODUCT LIABILITY 133-35 (1990)); see also JOSEPH V. REES,
REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-REGULATION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 72-
80, 114-18 (1988) (offering a case study in the influence of workers' compensation
premiums and employer safety policy).
401 Mello & Brennan, supra note 62, at 1623.
402 Id.
403 Leape, supra note 205, at 1855 (discussing the aviation industry).
404 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 118 n. 14.
405 Id. at 115.
406 See generally John H. Eichhorn et al., supra note 327.
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hospital's anesthesiologists to investigate why their collective experience was
so poor.407 The group devised new techniques and equipment to lower the risk
of mishap. 408 At the same time, high malpractice premiums and bad publicity
prompted the American Society of Anesthesiologists to do an intensive study
of the causes of anesthesia-related injuries and to develop better protocols. 409
The improved standards and tools that resulted from these combined efforts
have since become standard across the country.410 As a result, mortality rates
dropped from 1 in 10,000-20,000 to 1 in about 200,000, a ten- to twenty-fold
improvement. 411  Liability. insurance premiums for the specialty of
anesthesiology went from being among the highest in medicine to among the
lowest.4 12
The successful transformation of anesthesiology was prompted in significant
part by the de facto system of exclusive enterprise liability operating at the
Harvard medical facilities. Like most medical schools, Harvard protected its
physicians from the threat of liability by purchasing insurance on their
behalf.413 Having done so, Harvard had a strong incentive to look for ways to
bring down the cost of that insurance. The fruits of this incentive are harvested
each time a patient awakens from anesthesia unharmed.
The benefits to be gained from enterprise liability are also suggested by the
identity of the institutional leaders in the patient safety movement. Many
promising safety initiatives are led by hospitals and managed care
organizations which already operate under a system of de facto exclusive
enterprise liability.4 14 For example, the Wall Street Journal recently reported
that the Veterans Administration and managed-care giant Kaiser Permanente
are leading an effort to improve diagnostic accuracy by using new tools, like
computer decision-support systems, to help order correct tests, institute proper
follow-up plans, obtain complete medical histories, and perform adequate
physical exams.4 15 The two hospitals at the forefront of the movement to
voluntarily disclose errors - the VA hospital in Lexington, Kentucky and the
407 Id. at 1017.
408 Id. at 1018-20.
409 See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the
U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L.
REv. 893, 919-20 (2005) (describing the history of anesthesia quality improvement).
410 Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, in MARGIN OF ERROR: THE ETHICS OF MISTAKES
IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 95, 107 (Susan B. Rubin & Laurie Zoloth eds., 2000).
41" Hyman & Silver, supra note 409, at 918.
412 Id. at 918-20.
413 Eichhorn et al., supra note 406, at 1017.
414 Tom Baker calls this "enterprise insurance." BAKER, supra note 72, at 174-78.
Others call it insurance "channeling." See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 52 , at 126.
415 Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Preventing the Tragedy of Misdiagnosis, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 29, 2006, at D1.
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teaching hospital at the University of Michigan - also employ and insure their
attending physicians. 416
Exclusive enterprise liability, whether de jure or de facto, also has the
potential to modestly increase physician participation in patient safety
initiatives along with physician willingness to disclose medical errors to
patient safety committees. 4 17 By eliminating individual liability, enterprise
liability will make it easier for hospitals to institute a "blame-free" culture that
encourages open discussion of errors. Unlike confidentiality rules and
damages caps, however, it accomplishes this objective without depriving
injured patients of the redress to which they are entitled.41 8
The likelihood that enterprise liability will allow physicians to discuss errors
and near misses more freely is suggested not only by common sense, but also
by studies which have found that independent practicing physicians are less
likely to support the disclosure of errors than physicians who work for an
institution. 419 Private physicians are more likely to see disclosure proponents
as naive; they are "reluctant to do anything that might precipitate a lawsuit." 420
This attitude predictably stems from physicians' personal exposure to
malpractice liability, a risk physicians don't face when protected by large
insured institutions. 421 Little wonder that the leaders in the movement for
greater disclosure were large, self-insured institutions whose physicians had
much less concern about malpractice insurance availability and premiums. 422
Enterprise liability also has advantages unrelated to patient safety. For
example, exclusive enterprise liability would save litigation costs by
consolidating the defense of the hospital and all its providers. 423 According to
one report, about 25% of all medical malpractice cases have two or more
defendants. 424  Second, exclusive enterprise liability places the burden of
purchasing liability insurance on a corporate entity that is more likely than an
individual physician to plan ahead for the peaks and troughs of the insurance
416 Id.
417 For a discussion of reasons why legal reforms are destined to have limited effect, see
supra text accompanying notes 374-384.
411 See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reform of Medical Liability and Patient Safety: Are Health
Courts and Medicare the Keys to Effective Change?, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 252, 254
(2006).
419 See Gallagher et al., US and Canadian Physicians, supra note 377, at 1610; see also
Gallagher et al., Choosing Your Words Carefully, supra note 380, at 1591.
420 Thomas H. Gallagher & Wendy Levinson, Commentary, Disclosing Harmful Medical




423 BAKER, supra note 72, at 178.
424 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 119.
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cycle and to weather them relatively smoothly. 425 More than any other single
factor, the periodic spikes of the insurance cycle precipitated the malpractice
insurance and political crises of the 1970s, 1980s, and 2001.426 Any
malpractice reform that hopes to end these crises must temper the impact of
these inevitable premium spikes on individual physicians. 427  Enterprise
liability has played this role in other social-enterprise fields;428 it could do the
same in health care. Without enterprise liability, the current health court
proposal offers nothing to soften the insurance cycle's impact on individual
physicians' pocketbooks.
Third, enterprise liability removes the unfair penalty currently imposed on
physicians who practice in a high-risk specialty, like obstetrics, neurosurgery,
or emergency medicine. 429  Physicians who practice in these high-risk
specialties play a vital role in our health care system, yet they pay far higher
premiums than their colleagues in lower-risk specialties. 430 Some reformers
have suggested that the state, or other providers, give these specialties financial
assistance. Enterprise liability provides an even more elegant solution. It
shifts to the hospital the burden of insuring against injuries that occur in the
hospital and its clinics and, to this extent, removes the financial penalty
currently associated with high-risk practice. 431 Once again, this is a lesson
learned decades ago in other industries; neither airline pilots nor fuselage
welders are required to buy their own liability insurance.432
Of course, enterprise liability has its own set of potential disadvantages. For
example, eliminating individual physician liability could theoretically dilute
the effort physicians make to avoid patient injuries. Yet, that signal is already
badly diluted by the availability of liability insurance that is not experience-
rated and by widespread physician disbelief that the malpractice system
rewards competence. The legal incentive to reduce iatrogenic injury that
enterprise liability places on hospital systems is likely to produce more
powerful and more productive pressures on individual physicians than
individual liability.
Second, enterprise liability introduces the problem of defining the
boundaries of hospitals' vicarious liability. 433 Lawmakers will need to decide
such issues as whether injuries occurring in outpatient facilities or those caused
425 See BAKER, supra note 72, at 165.
426 See id. at 51-52.
427 See id. at 67.
428 See id. at 163-64.
429 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 116.
430 Id. at 115-16.
131 See BAKER, supra note 72, at 175.
432 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 116 & n. 14.
433 Furthermore, about 90% of the claims and payments now being made arise out of care
given inside a hospital. Id. at 114.
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by errors during office visits following hospitalization should be included.434
However, there is no reason to believe the task of defining these legal
boundaries will be any more troublesome than countless others that lawmakers
regularly tackle.
Third, the federal anti-kickback laws, as currently written, may make it
illegal for hospitals that do not employ their treating physicians to voluntarily
purchase insurance coverage for all the physicians on their staffs. 435 However,
that has yet to be determined. Furthermore, state legislation imposing
enterprise liability would sidestep the problem.
436
Finally, in cases involving patient injuries caused by individual carelessness,
not poor system design, exclusive enterprise liability will insulate the morally
responsible person from legal responsibility. This dilution of corrective justice
is a serious cost. However, liability insurance already weakens the link
between victim and tortfeasor, especially in the absence of experience
rating. 437 Furthermore, the improved deterrence enterprise liability will likely
produce offers patients an adequate quid pro quo. That is why lawmakers have
tolerated de facto enterprise liability in so many other areas of tort liability. 438
In addition, enterprise liability will enhance the system's ability to provide just
compensation whenever responsibility for the patient's injuries lies as much or
more in a poorly designed system as in an individual lapse of judgment.
Because the benefits of enterprise liability far outweigh its disadvantages,
many respected health law scholars recommend it. They include Clark
Havighurst, 439 Paul Weiler,440 Troyen Brennan, 441 Michelle Mello,44 2 David
Studdert,443 Tom Baker,444 and William Sage. 445 Although these scholars
414 Id. at 113-14.
431 See BAKER, supra note 72, at 176.
436 Id. at 176-77.
437 See WEILER ET AL., supra note 8, at 147-48; Mello & Brennan, supra note 62, at 1626.
438 See Mello & Brennan, supra note 62, at 1604-06.
439 Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of
Medical Care, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 8 (2000) (advocating vicarious liability for managed
care plans).
440 Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REv. 381, 381 (1994); see
also WEILER ET AL., supra note 8, at 114.
441 Mello & Brennan, supra note 62, at 1598.
42 Id.
443 See generally supra note 61.
4 BAKER, supra note 72, at 164-65 (recommending that hospitals be obliged to purchase
"enterprise insurance" covering all claims against medical providers using hospital
facilities). He believes that doctors and hospitals might more readily accept enterprise
insurance than enterprise liability because formal liability is resisted by physicians. Id. at
175-76.
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differ on a number of issues, like the choice between hospitals and managed
care organizations as the responsible "enterprise," they agree on the need for
institutional, rather than individual, responsibility. 446
Why then is enterprise liability missing from the package of reforms
bundled together in the current health courts proposal? The answer almost
certainly lies in the anticipated opposition of hospital associations and
physicians groups. While hospitals have an obvious financial reason to resist
the transfer of legal responsibility entirely onto their shoulders, the issue is
more complex for physicians. On the one hand, exclusive enterprise liability
would take them out of the shadow of tort liability and permit them to focus on
their patients.447 On the other hand, physicians have traditionally opposed
expanding hospital vicarious liability because they fear it will bring greater
interference with their medical decision making. 448 Yet, this objection, as the
ALI notes, "evokes a health care world that has long since passed. '449 With
rare exceptions, physicians already function as part of complex systems.
Surely, physicians understand the importance of building those systems
carefully. Furthermore, Tom Baker rightly observes that enterprise liability
has existed in university hospitals and staff-model health maintenance
organizations for many years without revolt.450
Sooner or later, tort law needs to adapt to this modem era.451 In hindsight, it
is now obvious that the law's delay in doing so has been bad for both
physicians and patients, keeping individual physicians on the front line of
malpractice litigation and depriving patients of the safety systems that
enterprise liability will produce. As a result, the absence of enterprise liability
in the current health court proposal is a very serious weakness.
CONCLUSION
Any critique of the health court plan proposed by Common Good and the
Harvard School of Public Health must acknowledge the good faith of its
sponsors. They are genuinely driven by a desire to make both the legal system
and the health care system better for physicians and patients alike. This
orientation is both rare and refreshing.
45 William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health Care
Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 1, 1 (1994) (advocating vicarious liability for
managed care plans).
446 See Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for Physicians and
Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1929, 1979 (2003) (using economic
analysis to show that managed care organizations should be vicariously liable even if they
do not exert direct control over physicians).
47 See Mello & Brennan, supra note 62, at 1629.
448 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 125.
449 Id.
450 BAKER, supra note 72, at 177.
451 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY, supra note 51, at 126.
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Yet, their plan is badly flawed by its omission of enterprise liability. To put
the matter succinctly, they are reviving the wrong plan. The ALl model, even
without no-fault liability, is far superior to the AMA model. By favoring the
AMA approach, the sponsors of health courts seek the administrative
efficiencies that a no-fault recovery regime would provide and the patient
safety improvements that enterprise liability would produce without adopting
either no-fault liability or enterprise liability. Without those features, the
outcomes are very likely to be disappointing.
Is the proposal for health courts, nevertheless, good enough to warrant pilot
tests? Answering that question requires a balancing of the plan's potential
benefits against its risks. The principal point of the plan is to take medical
malpractice cases away from juries and hired experts and turn them over to
specialized judges and court-appointed experts, in the hopes of producing
fairer outcomes and reducing physician distrust.4 52 Yet, the data demonstrate
that the judicial system does a remarkably good job of sorting the strong cases
from the weak and producing fair settlements. 453 The room for improvement is
very limited. Furthermore, the data clearly reveal that physicians benefit from
jury errors far more often than plaintiffs. 454 As a result, physicians are unlikely
to recognize or to appreciate a genuine improvement in the fairness of
malpractice adjudication.
At the same time, the potential for modest improvement in the fairness of
malpractice outcomes must be balanced against the risk that a specialized
tribunal would be even less fair to injured patients than juries are. A
specialized court is more vulnerable to capture by repeat players. In health
courts, the repeat players will be the liability insurers and their counsel. In
addition, the dependence of the health court judges on the guidance of court-
appointed physicians could produce a pro-physician bias. The risk that trial
judges will not share the values of the public is one important reason why
common law cases in this country have historically been tried before juries.455
Insofar as fairer outcomes are the objective of the health court proposal, the
risks of bias seem more significant than the modest potential for more accurate
decisions. Should a jurisdiction decide to take these risks, however, it is
crucial that it collect the data needed to determine whether appointed
physicians are willing to criticize physician defendants.
Proponents believe that an administrative court model will be more efficient,
processing claims more quickly and less expensively. However, great care will
need to be taken when determining which of the procedural protections found
in the civil courts should be abandoned in the new health courts. If complex
medical malpractice cases are to be resolved as fairly as they are under the
current system, health courts will need procedures that match those of the most
452 See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
451 See supra notes 91-116 and accompanying text.
414 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
411 See supra notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
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formal administrative courts, such as the Court of Federal Claims. 456 Although
the robust procedural protections provided by those tribunals would strip
health courts of the speed and cost advantages so highly touted by health court
proponents, those strong procedural protections are necessary to insure that
health court outcomes are as fair as those rendered today. Cut-rate decision
making raises the risk of cut-rate justice. If reformers want a considerably
faster and less adversarial process, then they will need to eliminate the element
of fault.
Health courts are also likely to disappoint the hopes of sponsors who believe
that the simplified claiming process will reduce the problem of under-claiming
by patients who are injured by medical negligence. That is because the
favorable impact of a simplified claims process will be more than offset by the
plan's abrogation of the collateral source rule. By reducing compensable
damages substantially, the plan will make it more difficult for many patients
with meritorious cases to find attorneys.
At the same time, the plan lacks any reforms to reduce the number of
meritless claims that are filed. Because unfounded malpractice claims impose
serious social and personal costs, the initial claims process is the weakest link
in the present adjudicative process. Yet, the health court plan does not address
this issue.
In other respects, however, the health court plan has considerable promise.
The combination of written opinions, binding ex ante guidelines, and ACEs,
for example, has the potential to modestly improve the fairness of judicial
outcomes. These reforms are likely to make the legal standard of care more
concrete and to yield verdicts that are more consistent over time. At the same
time, they do not appear to carry the same risk of bias as some of the plan's
other provisions, like exclusive reliance on court-appointed physicians. Even
though there is a limit to the detail with which legal standards of conduct can
be articulated in advance, a pilot test of these provisions would be valuable.
The proposed damages schedule is also a very promising provision. That
schedule has the potential to make non-economic damages more consistent
and, thus, more fair, while simultaneously eliminating the issue of excessive
awards. However, that beneficial potential will evaporate if the level of
damages set by these schedules does not approximate current jury awards. If
the levels of recovery are reasonable, then this reform warrants an experiment.
In addition, several provisions of the health courts plan could lead to
improvements in patient safety. Most promising are the state-of-the-art
standard of care, the centralized collection of data on medical accidents, and
clearer ex ante standards of care. However, the improved deterrent signal that
sponsors hope will result from the simplified claims procedure is likely to be
offset by the barrier to claiming produced by abrogation of the collateral
source rule and by the continued reliance of physicians on liability insurance
that is not experience-rated. Furthermore, the transfer of malpractice cases
456 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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from juries to specialized health courts is highly unlikely to produce greater
openness among physicians about medical error. That change will require
either a major transformation of physician culture or the adoption of hospital
enterprise liability - perhaps both.
Without enterprise liability, the very modest benefits that the current health
court proposal is likely to confer are closely matched by the genuine risks of
bias and overreaching that they also present. On the positive side, some
improvement in patient safety is likely to result from several of the plan's
provisions, though the gains are likely to be far smaller than those reasonably
expected from the adoption of enterprise liability. 457  In addition, the
provisions of the plan that make the standard of care more concrete have the
potential to improve the fairness, predictability, and consistency of the
adjudicated outcomes.
These potential benefits are matched, however, by serious shortcomings.
Most troubling is the risk that specialized health courts and their purportedly
neutral experts will, instead, be biased toward physicians. The promised
streamlining of procedures is also likely to favor physicians over patients.
Although this bias can be cured, the cure would sacrifice the financial savings
currently promised by the proposal. Finally, the scheduling of damages comes
with the risk - perhaps, the likelihood - that the caps will be set at levels that
inadequately compensate injured patients. Given these shortcomings, the case
for the current health court plan, with its failure to include enterprise liability,
is unpersuasive.
The case for a pilot experiment would be enhanced if provisions were added
to reduce the risk of unfair outcomes. Assurances of an adequate opportunity
for discovery, protections against the selection of biased experts by the health
courts (such as the use of multiple experts or a party-driven selection process
similar to the selection of an arbitrator), explicit preservation of the ability of
the parties to call their own expert witnesses, and a fair schedule for pain and
suffering damages would reduce that risk. The stronger these protections are,
the stronger the argument that health courts will provide a fair alternative to
civil courts.
Even these improvements will not be sufficient, however, in the absence of
enterprise liability. As a matter of both legislative policy and constitutional
doctrine, any reform that eliminates the right to a jury trial should offer injured
patients a reasonable quid pro quo. Without enterprise liability, the health
court plan offers patients only the possibility of a small improvement in the
safety of health care delivery systems. That is not enough.
"I These provisions include a tougher standard of care, the centralized collection of data
on medical errors, and the clearer ex ante guidance provided by the combination of the new
definition of the standard of care, the issuance of written opinions with precedential effect,
the greater weight given to authoritative clinical guidelines, and the identification of ACEs
in advance. Of course, the magnitude of the safety improvements is impossible to predict.
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